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Abstract
The ontological issues at stake given the theory of loop quantum gravity (LQG)
include the status of spacetime, the nature and reality of spin-networks, the re-
lationship of classical spacetime to issues of causation and the status of the
abstract-concrete distinction. I this paper I argue that, while spacetime seems
to disappear, the spirit of substantival spacetime lives on under certain interpre-
tations of the theory. Moreover, in order for there to be physical spin-networks,
and not merely mathematical artifacts, I argue that we must interpret the
theory as including a substantival background manifold. This latter result is
important for any project which interprets spacetime as an emergent structure
from physical spin-networks.
1 Introduction
In the current literature on loop quantum gravity (LQG), one will find the following claims:
The spin networks do not live in space; their structure generates space. And
they are nothing but a structure of relations...
(Smolin 2002, p.138)
...the quanta of the field cannot live in spacetime: they must build “spacetime”
themselves... Physical space is a quantum superposition of spin networks...a
spin network is not in space it is space.
(Rovelli 2004, p.9, 21)
LQG thus seems to entail that space(time) is not fundamental, but emerges
somehow from the discrete Planck-scale structure.
(Wu¨thrich 2006, p.169)
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...the emergence of spacetime continuum and geometry will be the result of the
quantum properties of the atoms of spacetime.
(Oriti 2014, p.15)
One influential idea based on so-called ‘weave states’ proposes that the space-
time structure emerges from appropriately benign, i.e. semi-classical, spin-
networks. (Huggett and Wu¨thrich 2013, p.279)
Such claims cause one to wonder: what kind of objects are spin-networks which quite
literally ground spacetime? Surely, nothing like anything we have ever known. In this
paper, I will address what might be the ontology of LQG in general and of spin-networks
in particular.
LQG begins with Dirac’s quantization procedure and ends with a Hilbert space of states
and a set of physical observables. By analyzing these structures, we will be able to begin to
understand what the “atoms of spacetime” are like. Like most physical theories, there is no
single metaphysical interpretation forced by LQG. Consequently, I am not under the illusion
that this work is complete; rather, I aim to clarify some of the issues at stake and establish
a foundation upon which further analysis may be continued.1 Some of the issues involved
in the theory of LQG include: the nature of spacetime, the relationship of geometry to
spacetime, the status of abstract objects, the relationship of quantum systems to classical
structures, the relationship of (pseudo-)Riemannian structures to physical objects (and
to concrete objects), the debate over substantivalism, the problem of time, the notion of
locality, and the notion of emergence.
Hagar (2014) addresses issues of geometry, Wu¨thrich (2014) as well as Smolin and
Markopoulou (2007) address issues of locality, Huggett and Wu¨thrich (2013) as well as Lam
and Esfeld (2013) address emergence and the issue of local be-ables, and finally Wu¨thrich
(2014), Isham (1992), and Norton (2015) as well as many others address the ”problem of
time.” However, in order to discuss spacetime emergence or locality, for instance, we must
first know what objects there are in LQG and what those objects are like. In this paper, I
develop eight interpretations of LQG and highlight the ontology suggested by them. Only
under some of these interpretations is spacetime missing from the ontology of the theory
and is in “need” of emergence, and only under certain others are there spin-networks.
While eight interpretations seem like a tall order, a few of these interpretations are mere
variations of each other and for two interpretations, I provide only the broadest of outlines.
Since my interest is to understand the ontology of LQG, most of the interpretations are
developed just enough to extract some facts about ontology. Due to the limited space of
1 The following account assumes the “canonical approach” (as opposed to the “covariant approach”) to
LQG which takes structures in space as being fundamental (spin-networks/s-knots) rather than structures
in spacetime (spin-foam). For the purposes of this paper, this difference will not matter. For ease of
expression, I will use “space” and “spacetime” interchangeably.
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this article, I cannot address every interpretation or philosophically important nuance of
the interpretations I discuss. Rather than covering every possible interpretation, I have
chosen to focus on what I hope will be a diverse collection of intuitive interpretations.
Moreover, in the course of discussing the ontology of LQG, I will be forced to make use
of a variety of physical and philosophical concepts: quantization, emergence, composition,
substantivalism, relationism, and yet I do not provide anything like a complete account or
overview of how these concepts have been used in general relativity (GR) and how they
might be used in LQG. For instance, I will briefly discuss relationism in the context of
explicating Rovelli’s interpretation, yet I do not provide a general metaphysical account
of what exactly relationism amounts to or an overview of different ways one can be a
relationist in LQG (which is of special concern since spacetime itself might be missing).
As a means of coming to understand the ontology of LQG, I will answer the following
questions on behalf of different interpretations of the theory:
1. In providing a quantum theory of general relativity, does LQG describe spacetime as
having gone missing?
2. Are spin-networks included in the ontology of LQG?
3. Is spacetime emergent from or composed of spin-networks?
I will demonstrate that questions one and two depend rather heavily upon one’s inter-
pretation of the mathematics of LQG and upon what we take spacetime to be. Only
sometimes is there spacetime, and only sometimes are there spin-networks. Regarding
question three, I will argue that spacetime is emergent to the extent that it is an effective
structure. Whether or not effective structures are real objects of our ontology or merely
useful fictions, is a question which I leave open.
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2 The theory of LQG and the na¨ıve interpretation
In this section, I will explicate the theory of LQG for physics-informed non-specialists.
Since there is no interpretation free way of expressing the content of a physical theory, in
the following I will adopt a common theory-ladened-language. This language is colored
with explicit statements to the effect that space and spacetime are background structures
assumed by the theory. For instance:2
Nowadays, this approach is mostly pursued in a different form, based on ideas
of Ashtekar. The idea of “splitting” spacetime [M] into 3-dimensional slices
[Σ], and conceiving dynamics as evolution from one slice to another, remains;
but the basic dynamical variable is now, not a 3-geometry, but a 3-connection...
(Isham and Butterfield 1999, p.22)
For each given graph γ, considered embedded in the spatial manifold [Σ] where
the canonical analysis takes place.
2 Furthermore, throughout his text book on LQG (1991), Ashtekar consistently references space and space-
time, as background structures (p.xviii) equipped with spatial structure such as spatial topology (p.27).
Though, in at least one instance, Ashtekar signals that he is not fully committed to the 3-dimensional
manifold Σ as representing space: “The resulting canonical variables are then complex fields on a (“spa-
tial”) 3-manifold Σ.” (p.16) Notice that Ashtekar places ‘spatial’ in scare-quotes. Presumably, this is
meant to highlight that without a metrical structure, Σ cannot itself denote space?
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(Oriti 2014, p.5)
... graphs which are embedded in space [Σ] in such a way that only nodes that
are within a few Planck distances of each other...
(Markopolou and Smolin 2007, p.2)
It is unlikely that any of these authors intended to endorse the metaphysical claim that the
mathematical 4-manifold M is physical spacetime or that 3-manifold Σ is space. What
is less clear is how many of these authors endorse the position that the bare manifold
M is sufficiently rich, on its own, to represent spacetime. It is usually assumed that
one needs both M as well as some metric g in order to have a structure rich enough to
represent spacetime. And yet, in LQG, M and Σ have no metric on them; consequently,
the physical systems we model using M and Σ are similarly impoverished. I suspect that
when physicists refer toM as being spacetime or the spacetime manifold, they are simply
using what ends up being a convenient language to speak of mathematics only and are not
endorsing a position on what physical spacetime is or what structure it has.
In the following exposition of LQG, I will follow this linguistic convention and refer
to M as the spacetime manifold or as representing spacetime, but I will go further and
explicitly develop, though not necessarily endorse, an interpretation around the conviction
that the bare manifold M does in fact represent spacetime. I will call this interpretation
“na¨ıve” though I do not call it na¨ıve in a disparaging sense.
According to the na¨ıve interpretation, LQG is a theory of quantum geometry and not
a theory of spacetime or quantum spacetime. It might not be obvious what the difference
is between these options, but it will become clear in the following. According to this
interpretation, the world consists of a substantival spacetime manifold which I will often
refer to as being “physically substantial,” represented by M, replete with “geometrically
charged” graphs (s-knots) represented by the s-knot states of the LQG.3 What s-knot states
and geometrically charged graphs are, will be explained shortly. The ontology of na¨ıve-
LQG is quantum since the geometry associated with each charged graph has quantum
features, which I will also discuss shortly.
Some might find the na¨ıve interpretation unattractive or even obviously false since the
bare manifold lacks the geometric structure which we have come to associate with space-
time. However, for three reasons, it will be useful to take the na¨ıve interpretation seriously.
First, the language of the na¨ıve interpretation is often used in the physics literature itself.
Second, in providing a quantum theory to replace GR, we need to loosen our commit-
ment to old associations. For instance, due to our familiarity with general relativity, we
have come to associate physical causes with light cone structures and space and time with
〈M, g〉. However, just because spacetime was described by 〈M, g〉 in GR, does not mean
that it ought to continue to have this description in all future theories. In fact, we know
3 If there is matter or energy in the world, then the world includes these items as well.
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that it won’t have this description since there is no metric g in LQG. Of course, I do not
mean to suggest that just any interpretation of ‘spacetime’ should be taken seriously, but
rather that we cannot rule out interpretations simply by referring to what is true in GR.
Third, I will use the na¨ıve interpretation as the starting point for developing alternative
interpretations. For this reason, the na¨ıve interpretation will prove to be a pedagogical
aide and a contrast against which to discuss additional interpretations. In §3, I will de-
velop alternative interpretations, all of which are less na¨ıve and some of which are not
substantival.
One can find many introductions to the theory of LQG, but few are non-technical
and most use heuristics which are detrimental for understanding the theory’s ontology.
In the following account, I have aimed to explain LQG with less mathematics and have
relegated some of the technical details to an appendix and others to citations. Though
the following mathematical explication of the theory is, at times, terse, I have aimed to
provide an account sufficient for understanding the logic of the relevant arguments if not
the details. Throughout this text, I will refer to content in the appendix with its section
number “[A(§#)]”.
2.1 Constraints
The theory of LQG begins with a Hamiltonian formulation of GR, and proceeds to quantize
the theory by quantizing the gravitational field following an approach developed by Dirac.
Dirac’s procedure is the “canonical” route for quantizing classical theories.4 In building a
canonical theory, one begins by constructing the total Hamiltonian, (Gambini and Pullin
2011, p.50):
HT ≡ q˙ipi − L+ λmΦm.
This expression is constructed by subtracting the Lagrangian of the system from the prod-
uct of the canonical positions and momenta, and then adding terms representing the con-
straints of the system. In canonical GR, the Lagrangian exactly cancels the contribution
of the q˙ip
i so that the HT is nothing but the second class constraints λjΦj (DeWitt 1967
p.1118). In general these constraints are equations of the form:5
λjΦ
j = 0.
and represent trajectories through phase space which don’t affect the Hamiltonian (Gam-
bini and Pullin 2011, p.49,96). Since the total Hamiltonian is identical to the constraints,
all the information of the dynamics of the system is captured by solving the constraints
(Isham 1992, p.34-35). In the case of LQG, there are three such constraints: the Gauss,
4 For technical details on canonical quantum gravity, see Isham (1992), Henneaux and Teitelboim (1992),
Rovelli (2004), Wu¨thrich (2006, 2014), Thiemann (2008), as well as the appendix to this paper.
5 For a more detailed expression of theses constraints see Gambini and Pullin( 2011, p.94), or Rovelli (2004
p.146, 225).
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vector, and scalar constraint. In the literature, there are other names for these constraints:
the Gauss constraint is often referred to as the gauge constraint, the vector constraint as the
diffeomorphism constraint, and the scalar as the Hamiltonian constraint. I will always use
‘Gauss’ and ‘Hamiltonian constraint’ but will switch between ‘vector’ and ‘diffeomorphism
constraint.’ The Gauss constraint requires the physical system of LQG to be invariant
under an internal gauge transformation, the vector constraint requires the system to be
invariant under spatial diffeomorphisms, and the scalar constraint requires the system to
be invariant under a reparametrization of the time coordinate (Gambini and Pullin 2011,
p.93-94, Rovelli 2004, p.146, 225). There is an industry debating whether or not these
constraints require or suggest that variation across space and through time is either frozen
or missing. This presumed lack of evolution is called the “problem of time” and is thought
to be the problem in LQG.6
In classical mechanics, a constraint equation on phase space, C(q, p) = b, is upgraded
in the quantum theory to the operator constraint equation: CˆΨ(q) = bΨ (Gambini and
Pullin 2011, p.99). In LQG, our Hamiltonian is identical to three constraints of this form
where b = 0 [A(§5.1)] (Gambini and Pullin 2011, p.93, Rovelli 2004, p.225). The goal of
LQG is to look at the space of all functionals Ψ of our phase space variable A and project
down onto the space of states which solve all three constraints. This space represents all
the physical states of LQG. The scalar constraint is the only constraint which has not been
solved.7 It is conventional to speak of the Hilbert space of LQG in terms of the states which
solve the Gauss and vector constraints, though technically the physical Hilbert space will
be some subspace of this which solves all three constraints.
2.2 Spin-networks and s-knots
In the following, I will explicate the theory further by discussing first the Gauss constraint
and then the vector constraint. At each stage, I will provide the na¨ıve interpretation of
the states which solve the relevant constraint(s) and will thereby unpack, in stages, the
na¨ıve-ontology. In developing the theory of LQG (2004), Rovelli implicitly endorses the
na¨ıve interpretation up through the Gauss-stage and then jettisons it when considering the
vector constraint (p.238). Contrary to Rovelli, I will push the na¨ıve interpretation through
the vector-constraint-stage as a means of filling out or completing the na¨ıve interpretation.
In order to solve the Gauss constraint, one first identifies a graph of links (lines) and
6 It turns out that some version of the problem of time is present in any theory which utilizes the Hamil-
tonian version of GR. In other words, the problem of time is not a special problem for LQG (Earman
2002). For more on the problem of time see Isham (1991, 1992), Kucharˇ (1992), Earman (2002), Wu¨thrich
(2014) and Norton (2015).
7 I will make claims regarding the ontology of LQG using only those states which satisfy the first two
constraints. Since the true physical states lie in the intersection of the solutions to all three constraints,
solving the final constraint will not take us out of the space of solutions of the first two constraints. Once
solved, the true space of physical states may suggest modifications to the ontology of LQG as described
here.
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nodes (points) embedded in the mathematical manifold M. The manifold M, in which
the graphs are embedded, is the manifold of GR stripped of its metrical structure. Recall
that in GR a model for spacetime is given by the pair 〈M, g〉. M is a four-dimensional
continuum of points endowed with a topology and differential structure, g is the metric field
and responsible for the geometric properties of spacetime. In LQG, we explicitly quantize
only the gravitational field, represented by g, and do nothing to the manifold M.8 It is
because LQG takesM for granted that the na¨ıf interprets LQG as being a quantum theory
of gravity or geometry but not spacetime.
In order to incorporate the physics of general relativity into what will become LQG,
we rewrite the metric g in terms of a vector potential defined by an su(2)-gauge field A
[A(§5.1)] (Rovelli 2004, p.46). We transform the values of this field at each point into
an SU(2)-matrix using holonomies along the links of the graph and by “coloring” each
link with a representation of the SU(2) gauge group (ergo spin-network).9 In effect, the
colorings pick a group of matrices which act on a certain sized vector space.10 Every
link is assigned a potentially different representation, and each point along the link gets
assigned a particular matrix from the representation [A(§5.1)]. The idea is that for each
point along a network’s link, there is an associated matrix determined by the field A and
the color of the link. A spin-network is a graph whose links and nodes are geometrically
“charged” due to the su(2)-gauge field defined on them. Just as in GR, where collections
of spacetime points are associated with a geometry, so in LQG, graphs are associated with
a quantum geometry.11 The quantum geometry of LQG (given by the colorings) plus a
graph of lines and points is a spin-network. To be clear, at this point in the discussion, I
am only speaking about mathematical objects; thus, in saying that the graphs on M are
charged, I am speaking loosely. However, in just a moment, I will translate, on behalf of
the na¨ıve interpretation, this mathematical language into a description of physical objects.
We associate to each embedded spin-network, a unique gauge invariant functional of the
vector potential called a spin-network state |S(·)〉, [A(§5.2)] (Rovelli and Peush 1998,
p.233-237).12 These states form a basis of the Hilbert space of gauge invariant functionals
[A(§5.2)]. Thus, each embedded spin-network defines a basis vector in the gauge invariant
Hilbert space:
Spin-network⇒ |Γ(~x), jn, im〉 ≡ |S(·)〉. (1)
8 For a discussion on the appropriateness of assuming a continuum manifold in canonical quantum gravity,
see Isham and Butterfield (1999). Their article also discusses more radical programs for quantizing
gravity which do not assume a classical manifold.
9 Holonomies are built out of parallel – transport maps. Amongst other things, these maps transform the
elements of our algebra su(2) into elements of the group SU(2) (Rovelli and Peush 1998, p.2).
10 Each color is associated with a vector space of a different dimension.
11 As we shall, see this assumption about GR and LQG does not hold up when we consider the diffeomor-
phism invariance of the theory.
12 Varying the vector potential changes how much charge the network has; however, a variation equal to a
gauge transformation does not change the functional defined on it. By varying the gauge field we vary
which SU(2) group element/ matrix is associated with any point.
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Figure 1: We “color” certain graphs in the sub-manifold Σ ofM with quantum gravitational information. Colored
graphs are called spin-networks and are used to construct the Hilbert space of spin-network states. We identify a
spin-network state with each embedded network.
The jn keep track of which links (n) have what algebraic spin information (j) and the im
keep track of which nodes (m) have what algebraic information (i).13 The embedded graph
Γ(~x) is a geometrically contiguous series of links and nodes.
Figure 2: The na¨ıf interprets embedded structures in Σ as literally modeling spatially embedded graphs.
I will stipulate as part of the na¨ıve interpretation that structures onM, which happen to
be picked out by the physical states of the theory, are also to be interpreted in a fairly literal
way. Consequently, since spin-networks are embedded structures in M and are picked out
by vector states of the gauge invariant Hilbert space, the ontology of LQG, according to the
na¨ıf, includes gravitationally “charged” substantival graphs (Figure 2). These graphs are
13 The nodes of the network are also colored. See [A(§5.2)] for why this coloring is important.
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not mere mathematical objects but are composed of spacetime points which are themselves
physical objects according to the na¨ıf. These graphs are gravitationally charged since LQG
represents them as having suitably quantized gravitational properties encoded by the su(2)
gauge field. There are times where Rovelli implicitly adopts this ontology (2004 p.147-150),
even though, at the end of the day, this is not what he actually thinks the world is like
given LQG (see §3.2).
Although I have not yet discussed the observables of LQG (see §2.3), it is consistent with
these observables to claim that open sets of spacetime which include highly charged spin-
networks, have a large volume or large area. A three-dimensional region of spacetime points
which includes a highly charged node is said to have a large volume and a two-dimensional
surface of spacetime points which is “cut”, by a highly charged link is said to have a large
area (Figure 4). The picture that one should have at this stage in the development of the
na¨ıve interpretation is a picture of charged networks embedded in the fabric of spacetime.
The charge of each network is related to the matter and energy of spacetime and governs
the lengths and sizes of spacetime’s quantum geometry. The ontology of gravitationally
charged, physically substantial graphs, which are responsible for the quantum geometry of
physical regions and surfaces, is only possible at the level of the Gauss constraint. In order
to solve the diffeomorphism constraint, the vector constraint, we will have to construct a
new set of mathematical states as well as a new physical structure for them to represent.
A diffeomorphism can smoothly stretch and shift a network around a manifold, in this
case, the three-dimensional manifold Σ. The diffeomorphism constraint requires that our
physical states be invariant under this manipulation. This constraint presents a problem
if our states are defined with respect to particular embeddings inM (or more particularly
Σ). Networks which are bolted down to locations on M are not diffeomorphically invari-
ant. Therefore, in implementing the diffeomorphism constraint, our mathematical states
are promoted from being tied to particular spin-networks embedded at specific places to
equivalence classes, under diffeomorphisms, of such networks (Rovelli and Peush 1998,
p.238-242). Formally, this is achieved by mapping each diffeomorphically related spin-
network state (|S〉) to a specially constructed state (〈s|) in its “dual” space [A(§5.2)]. In
other words, build an equivalence class of diffeomorphically related states and map each of
these equivalence classes to a single state in the dual of the original space:
[|Sk〉] ≡ [|Γ(k)(~x)jn, im〉]→ 〈s~k|. (2)
Where, 〈s~k| is a functional on spin-network states |S〉 defined by:
〈s~k|S1〉 ≡
∑
[|Sk〉]
〈Sk|S1〉 (3)
〈s~k|(·) ≡
∑
[|Sk〉]
〈Sk|(·). (4)
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Here 〈Sk| is the unique dual vector to |Sk〉 such that its inner product (given by the Haar
measure) with |Sk〉 is one (Rovelli 2004, p.227-228). Moreover, [|Sk〉] is an equivalence class
of embedded networks (with identical coloring (jn, im)) such that for any a, b if |Sa〉 and
|Sb〉 ∈ [|Si〉], then there exists a diffeomorphism Φ such that:14
Γ(a)(~x) = Φ(Γ(b)(~x)). (5)
A generic s-knot is a superposition of s-knot states:
〈s| ≡
n∑
k=1
〈s~i,k| ≡
n∑
k=1
〈Γ(i)k (~x)jn, im|. (6)
The construction in equations (3) and (4) reads as follows: take the dual “bra-vector” to
each of our spin-network “ket-vectors” in the above equivalence class and identify the state
〈s|, with their sum [A(§5.2)].
The linear span of the 〈s|-states forms a Hilbert subspace in the dual space.15 The
〈s|-states are both gauge and diffeomorphism invariant, and we will refer to them as s-knot
states. A generic state in this Hilbert space is a superposition of s-knot states; though,
I will refer to both kinds of states simply as “s-knot states.” When it is important to
distinguish these two kinds of states, s-knots and generic superpositions of them, I will do
so.
There are different conventions for naming states which are both gauge and diffeomor-
phism invariant. Some authors use “spin-network state” to refer to any and all states even
if they satisfy the diffeomorphism constraint. These authors allow the context to specify
which mathematical structures are intended by the slightly ambiguous term. It is impor-
tant to keep this in mind when reading quotes throughout this paper since, often, claims
putatively about spin-networks states or spin-networks are really claims about s-knot states
and s-knots.
In the context of the na¨ıve interpretation, I will refer to the physical objects represented
by s-knot states (〈s|) as s-knots. When necessary to distinguish these physical structures
from their graphical representation in Σ, I will refer to the physical objects represented
by s-knot states as “physically substantial s-knots.”16 I will follow the same convention
regarding spin-networks and physically substantial spin-networks (or just physical spin-
networks). In most cases, I will allow the context to specify whether I am speaking about
mathematical or physical structures.
14 Of course, any state |S〉 which is related to some |Si〉 by a diffeomorphism is, by definition, a member of
[|Sk〉]. Also, this account is a bit simplistic and extra care is needed since, in general, a diffeomorphism
can change more than the graph Γ of a network (Rovelli 2004, p.238).
15 Technically, we must also take the “closure of the norm” of the vector space formed by the linear span
of the 〈s| in order to get a Hilbert space. (Rovelli, 2004 p.229)
16 Though, in §3.2 I will drop this association and will instead refer to the objects represented by s-knots
states as simply “quantum spacetime.” The reason for this change will become clear.
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According to the na¨ıf, s-knots, like spin-networks, are physically substantial networks
in the physical manifold. However, the result of making s-knot states diffeomorphism
invariant is that they are no longer associated with a single spin-network in M. Since
spin-networks in M are nailed down to locations in the manifold, we have been forced
to detach our diffeomorphism invariant states from them. If s-knot states are no longer
associated with a single embedded network, what physical thing in spacetime do s-knot
states represent?
Here the literature becomes a bit opaque and pushes away from the na¨ıve interpretation.
As a consequence of diffeomorphism invariance, Rovelli claims that s-knots are “abstract
graphs” and no longer “in space” (Rovelli 2004, p.19-2, p.283). Similarly, Wu¨thrich claims:
The (abstract) spin network states result after one has solved the Gauss [gauge]
and the spatial diffeomorphism constraints... These spin network states can be
represented by abstract graphs. (2006, p.92)
Here, (abstract) spin-network states, according to Wu¨thrich, are just s-knot states (ibid). It
is not clear what Rovelli is claiming by calling s-knots abstract, or Wu¨thrich by describing
s-knots states as being abstract (or as being represented by abstract graphs).17 What these
authors mean by calling s-knots abstract and as failing to be in spacetime is complicated,
and will take us too far afield if I were to address this issue. For the time being, I will simply
note that according to Rovelli and Wu¨thrich, the states of LQG do not represent networks
in a physical manifold, and this has something to do with the diffeomorphism constraint.
The vector-stage marks the interpretive split between what will become Rovellian-LQG and
the na¨ıve interpretation. In the following, I will argue that the na¨ıf, contrary to Rovelli
and Wu¨thrich, can interpret s-knots as concrete structures in the physically substantial
manifold.
In order to argue that it is possible that s-knot states are associated with particular
and well-defined structures inM and thereby with particular substantival networks in the
physical manifold, I will first explain how the proof that s-knot states are diffeomorphically
invariant works. I will then use this proof to motivate a particular conception of what
physically embedded s-knots are.
As a reminder, a generic s-knot state is defined as:
〈s| ≡
n∑
k=1
〈s~i,k| ≡
n∑
k=1
〈Γ(i)k (~x)jn, im|. (7)
A diffeomorphism UΦ on a basis vector 〈sk| is mathematically equivalent to 〈sk| ◦ UΦ−1 ≡
17 Similarly, in (1994) Baez claims that the states represent a collection of loops which are “not necessarily
embedded” in the spacetime manifold. In a private conversation with Baez, he (basically) endorsed the
same reason as Rovelli (§3.2), for thinking of the networks as unembedded.
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( ∑
[|Sk〉]
〈Sk|
)
◦ UΦ−1 ≡ (8)∑
[|UΦSk〉]
〈S| (9)
Where the summation is over all states |S〉 related to |UΦSk〉 by some diffeomorphism. Since
the set of states defining the summation in (3) and (9) are the same [A(§5.2)], the states
UΦ〈s| and 〈s| are the same. The preceding proof works by shoving the diffeomorphism into
the summation which defines the s-knots states. The proof proceeds by manipulating (UΦ)
each individual spin-network state (|S〉) and then noting that, when all is said and done,
the set of manipulated states is the same set with which we began.
Following this construction and proof, let me define a geometrically embedded s-knot
to be the composite of all diffeomorphically related embedded spin-networks. Just as a
single spin-network state corresponds to a single embedded network, so an s-knot state
corresponds to the entire composite of diffeomorphically related spin-networks (Figure 3).
Figure 3:
The proof that embedded s-knots, the geometric structures, are invariant under dif-
feomorphisms follows the proof that s-knot states are invariant under diffeomorphisms.
In general, we apply a differomorphism to embedded structures by way of their algebraic
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descriptions. For example in order to apply a diffeomorphism to a circle, we do not apply
the diffeomorphism map to the circular shape directly, but rather to its algebraic repre-
sentation. In the same way, in order to apply a diffeomorphism to an s-knot, i.e. the knot
of networks in Figure 3, we do so by applying the map Φ to the s-knot state. Since s-knot
states are invariant under diffeomorphisms, embedded s-knots are too.
We can visualize this algebraic mapping by “cutting out” fromM each network which
comprises the s-knot, “shift” and “glue” these networks back onto M. Since the original
composite of networks contains all spin-networks related by a diffeomorphism, the result
of shifting each network in the same way is to produce no overall change to the collection:
each network gets mapped to the location of one of its twin networks and so on. This
shifting around of networks produces the exact same configuration of embedded networks
with which we began. Since there is no change to the total collection, there is no change
to the geometric s-knot.
Previously, I amended the na¨ıve interpretation from merely interpreting M as repre-
senting a substantival manifold to also interpreting structures defined onM as representing
physical objects or structures in spacetime. I used this emendation to include spin-networks
as objects in the ontology of na¨ıve-LQG. If we apply the same reasoning to the case of s-
knots, our conclusion will be the same. Since geometrically embedded s-knots are picked
out by s-knot states, the na¨ıf interprets these structures as representing physically embed-
ded substantival s-knots.
Implicit in the preceding account, the na¨ıf assumes that spacetime points have haec-
ceities, or some other sort of primitive identity and that collections of these physically
substantial points are themselves physical. According to the na¨ıf, both spin-networks and
s-knots are composed of physically substantial spacetime points where“composed” means
that the basal structure of either kind of substantival network is a collection of spacetime
points. Just as an aluminum baseball bat is composed of a collection of aluminum atoms, so
spin-networks and s-knots are composed of a collection of physically substantial spacetime
points. Whatever we mean by “bats are composed of aluminum atoms,” is what the na¨ıf
means by “s-knots are composed of spacetime points.” Similarly, s-knots are a composite
of all the diffeomorphically smeared spin-networks in so far as s-knots are composed of the
substantival points from these networks.
2.3 Observables
Since LQG is a quantum theory aimed to replace GR, it will have observables corresponding
to the geometric structure of spacetime. Area and volume observables have been defined
in such a way that both spin-network states and s-knot states are eigenvectors of them
(Rovelli 2004, p.248, 262 and Rovelli and Pietri 1996, p.15). In just a moment, I will
present the area operator though few of the following mathematical particulars will be
required for our purposes. I present the area operator merely to highlight its dependence
on certain structures in the manifold, and how our embedded spin-networks (not s-knots)
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are related to the operator through these structures.
Aˆ(S) ≡ lim
n→∞
n∑
k
√√√√−(∫
S
(n)
k
dσ1dσ2abc
∂xa(~σ)
∂σ1
∂xb(~σ)
∂σ2
δ
δAic(~σ)
)2
(10)
The way to interpret Aˆ(S) is that we are measuring the value of some property Aˆ of
some spatial surface S. The Aˆ(S) operator is the concrete “area” observable of LQG.
The reason for italicizing area and volume is to distinguish the operators named by them
from the classical structures we normally intend. I call the area observable “concrete”
since it is defined in terms of embedded structures in the manifold M. In fact, the reason
for including this equation is to illustrate its dependence on the manifold: the integral is
defined in terms of a measure dσ1dσ2 over an embedded surface S. Moreover, the operator
δ
δAic(~σ) which acts on the states |S〉 is explicitly dependent on the values of the coordinate
functions (~σ) over S.
The area observable acts on spin-network states and has a spectrum of area eigenvalues:
Aˆ(S)|S〉 ≡
∑
n∈{S∩Γ(~x)S}
√
jn(jn + 1)|S〉. (11)
Embedded spin-networks carry charge (jn) on their links and so contribute to the value
of Aˆ(S).18 An embedded network will affect the value of Aˆ(S) for a given surface in two
ways: first, the number of its links which cross or cut the surface ({S∩Γ(~x)S}) will change
the number of things summed over in (11). And second, as we change the charge (jn) of
the links, we affect the size (
√
jn(jn + 1)) of each term in the sum.
19 Thus, so long as
there are no other networks in the vicinity, it is possible to increase the Riemannian area of
surface S and yet not increase Aˆ. For instance, consider a single embedded network with
one link which happens to cross the circular surface S. If we had a metric, we could change
the Riemannian size of the circle by doubling its radius though, since we do not change the
number of times with which the surface is cut by the link, we will not increase the physical
area defined by Aˆ. This is so, since the physical area described by Aˆ, is dependent only on
the number of links which cross S and the respective charges of those links. In addition,
if we keep S fixed but increase the charge (j1), the area associated with S will increase.
These results are similar to the situation in electromagnetism: to increase the electrical
charge of a plate we must add more charge, not simply increase the Riemannian size of
the plate. In the same way, to increase the area of a region, we must change our network,
not the bounds of our integration (Rovelli, 2004 p.269-270). A similar situation holds true
for our volume observable [A(§5.2)]: integrating over a larger region does not necessarily
produce a larger volume.
18 In (11) I indexed the network Γ(~x) with “S” in order to highlight that what is summed over depends on
the network |S〉.
19 Similarly, there are two ways for a network to affect the volume of a region: the number of nodes of a
network in that region and the size of their charge.
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The remarkable achievement of LQG and the reason for naming these observables area
and volume is that they produce eigenvalues which approximate their Rimannian name-
sakes when acting on certain states. For instance, there are special spin-network states
|Sw〉 such that (Rovelli 2004, p.268):
Aˆ(S)|Sw〉 = (A(g,S) +O(lp/l))|Sw〉 (12)
Vˆ(R)|Sw〉 = (V(g,R) +O(lp/l))|Sw〉. (13)
Here A(g,S) is the Riemannian area of surface S given by metric g and V(g,R), the
Riemannian volume. As we pull back from the Planck scale (l  lp), the values of our
observables approach their Riemannian counterparts. However, not all spin-network states
satisfy these equations. I have just noted that it is possible to increase the Riemannian
area without changing the value produced by Aˆ. The spin-network states which do satisfy
these equations are called “weave states” and are candidates for the coherent states of
LQG since they represent structures which most resemble properties of classical geometry.
Colloquially speaking, the coherent states of a generic quantum theory are the states which
most closely mimic the behavior of the associated classical system.
Throughout the remainder of this paper, I will no longer italicize “area” and “volume”
in reference to the observables of LQG. I have made this decision in an effort to signal that
if LQG is correct, physical areas and volumes are more accurately described by Aˆ(S) and
Vˆ(R) than by their Riemannian counterparts.
An important prediction of LQG is that the area of surfaces and the volume of regions
come in discrete Planck sized packages. This comes about because the graph of a network is
modified by adding or subtracting whole numbered links or nodes to it. And since the jn in
equation (11) only takes on integer values, a network can only add discrete units of area to
any given surface. Similar reasoning holds for the volume observable. Thus, the geometric
observables of LQG do not relate to the manifold as their Riemannian counterparts do since
these counterparts can take on a continuum of values. In fact, the important role played
by the manifold is in defining which nodes are contained in which regions and which links
cross which surfaces (Rovelli 2004, p.262-268). For instance, equation (11) is explicitly
dependent on n ∈ {S ∩ Γ(~x)S}; where n refers to particular links in the graph Γ(~x)S .
Our observables’ dependency on structures in the manifold means that they are not
“Dirac observables.” Since the observables of LQG act on the s-knot Hilbert space, we need
them to be both gauge and diffeomorphism invariant. Unfortunately, our observables are
explicitly dependent on particular surfaces S and regions R (Rovelli 2004, p.266) and thus
fail to be invariant under diffeomorphisms. Rovelli has offered some suggestions for how to
get around this issue,20 and claims that once we have gotten around it, the observables will
make no reference to particular regions and surfaces in the manifold and be dependent on
20 Rovelli suggests that we use the gauge freedom of the matter fields to make the observables diffeomor-
phically invariant, be content with partial observables, or use evolving constants (Rovelli and Peush p.7,
Rovelli 2004, p.266).
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the algebraic information of the s-knot states alone (Rovelli 2004, p.262-265). This means
that the spectrum of the observables, according to Rovelli, will depend only on the coloring
of the links and nodes, the number of nodes, and the algebraic-graphical information of
the networks (i.e. which nodes connect to which nodes), and not in any way on how the
networks are situated in the manifold.
My exposition of LQG from the perspective of the na¨ıve interpretation is almost
complete; before moving onto alternative interpretations, I will first address the “non-
separability problem.” The following account of the problem and its solution will serve
to further elaborate the structure of LQG: abstract networks and their relation to spin-
networks, notions of physical equivalence in LQG, and an often undiscussed modification
of the diffeomorphism constraint. The remaining portions of this section have less to do
with the na¨ıve interpretation per se and more to do with the structure of the theory. In
addition, this discussion will provide further motivation for Rovelli’s departure from the
na¨ıve interpretation.
2.4 Non-separability
Let us define two weave states to be physically equivalent just in case they yield the same
eigenvalue for every observable. Assuming that Rovelli is correct and the observables of
LQG rely only on the algebraic information of the states, then two spin-network weave
states are physically equivalent just in case they are algebraically identical. In this section,
I will argue that, as we have constructed it, LQG is artificially inflated by physically
equivalent states.
Let us begin with an “algebraic” graph Γ which tells us which algebraic nodes connect to
which algebraic lines. Algebraic lines and nodes are not instantiated as geometric structures
in M, they are instantiated purely algebraically. Technically the “algebraic” qualifier is
not required as, in and of itself, a graph is not embedded in a manifold. A graph is
merely a set of objects with a binary relation. When we embed an algebraic graph, we
associate a manifold point to each object in the set and we construct a line connecting
any two embedded points whose associated algebraic objects satisfy the binary relation.
In common parlance, a graph usually brings to mind an embedded graph, a geometric
collection of lines and points. In order to ensure that this geometric graph is not being
applied to Γ, I have called it algebraic.
After selecting Γ, we construct the algebraic network |Γ, jn, im〉 by coloring its lines
and nodes, which we then embed in two distinct ways. By embedding this network in
two distinct ways, we construct two distinct two spin-networks – |Γ(1)(~x), jn, im〉 and
|Γ(2)(~x), jn, im〉 – from a single algebraic network. Let us assume that our algebraic net-
work contains at least one node of “valence” four or higher (i.e. the node is connected to
four or more links).
The problem is, we can embed nodes with four or more links in ways which are not
related by a diffeomorphism (Rovelli and Fairbairn 2008, p.5-6). Having four linearly
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independent links in three-dimensional space means that there are some spatial configu-
rations of the network which cannot be achieved with smooth transformations. This is
because four linearly independent lines have one degree of freedom left unconstrained by
three-dimensional diffeomorphisms. This limitation, imposed by smoothness, will lead to
a non-separable Hilbert space of s-knot states (ibid).
Since Γ contains a node of valence four of higher, let us choose Γ(1)(~x) and Γ(2)(~x)
so that they are not related by a diffeomorphism. Now let us impose the diffeomorphism
constraint and construct our s-knot states,
|S1〉 ≡ |Γ(1)(~x)jn, im〉 → [|Γ(1)(~x)jn, im〉]→ 〈s1| (14)
|S2〉 ≡ |Γ(2)(~x)jn, im〉 → [|Γ(2)(~x)jn, im〉]→ 〈s2|. (15)
Since Γ(1)(~x) and Γ(2)(~x) are not related by a diffeomorphism, they belong to distinct
equivalence classes and will be mapped to different s-knots: 〈s1| 6= 〈s2|.
Generally, it is not problematic to have physical redundancy in our Hilbert space.
However, in this case, it is. It turns out that there are infinitely many, non-diffeomorphically
related embeddings for any network which contains a node of valence four or higher (Rovelli
and Fairbairn 2008, p.5-6). Thus, every spin-network containing a node of valence four or
higher will have infinitely many physically redundant copies of itself in the s-knot Hilbert
space. This artificial inflating of the s-knot Hilbert space forces the Hilbert space to be
non-separable since these s-knots form a basis for our new Hilbert space. Since the new
Hilbert space is non-separable, we cannot define an inner product on it which renders the
space of little use. In order to solve this problem, let us first review a few things about
gauge orbits.
In constraint mechanics, the constraints we generate encode symmetries of our system.
If we transform the system in accordance with the constraint, we move along a “constraint-
surface” or “gauge orbit” in the phase space and our Hamiltonian does not change. Thus,
we can use the constraints to specify regions (i.e. the orbits) of our phase space which
represent identical physical situations. Consequently, we have two distinct, though inti-
mately related, notions of physical equivalence: first, two states are physically equivalent
just in case our observables cannot distinguish them, and second, two states are physically
equivalent just in case they live on a gauge orbit of the theory. In order to ensure that
these notions match, we require that our observables be invariant along the gauge orbits
of the theory.
Operators which are invariant along the gauge-orbits of the theory are called Dirac
observables, and only they are candidates for representing physical properties of our sys-
tem. Previously, I noted that, as things stand, the geometric observables of LQG are not
Dirac observables since they are not invariant under diffeomorphisms. However, if we are
able to upgrade our observables and define them in such a way that they are diffeomor-
phically invariant, then as we move along the gauge orbits associated with s-knot states
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(i.e. those orbits consisting of all diffeomorphically related spin networks) the observables
will not vary. However, according to Rovelli, more than this is the case. Consider the set
of equivalence classes of diffeomorphically related embeddings of a single algebraic spin-
network: {[|Γ(1)(~x)jn, im〉], ..., [|Γ(k)(~x)jn, im〉]...}. It turns out that we can continuously
parameterize this set using variables called moduli. According to Rovelli, if our observ-
ables are invariant under diffeomorphisms, then they will be invariant under variations of
these moduli as well (Rovelli 2004, p.267). For this reason, Rovelli claims, “these moduli
are an artifact of the mathematics: they have nothing to do with the physics” (ibid).
If the observables were not moduli-invariant, the moduli would allow the manifold
to physically assert itself: some two distinct embeddings Γ(1)(~x) and Γ(2)(~x) of a single
algebraic graph Γ, would be physically distinguished by the Dirac observables of the theory.
However since the observables are invariant under variations of the moduli, the remaining
remnants of the manifold are erased. It is for this reason that Rovelli claims that the
observables of LQG are defined only by the algebraic properties of the states and nothing
else. Thus, the true gauge orbit, as seen by the invariance of the geometric observables,
is larger than the diffeomorphism-orbit and includes the moduli-orbit as well. Together
these orbits cover the entire manifold M: the observables of LQG, according to Rovelli,
will not distinguish any two embeddings of an algebraic network. Thus, M is invisible to
the physical observables of LQG.
Since the observables are invariant under diffeomorphisms as well as variations in mod-
uli, Rovelli does not actually impose the diffeomorphism constraint in constructing the
s-knot states; instead, Rovelli, and others, impose the “diff∗-constraint.” I will explain how
this constraint solves our non-separable problem and will then explain why we are justified
in using it. The diff∗-constraint requires that our physical states be invariant under all
spatial transformations which are smooth except at, at most, finitely many points (Rov-
elli 2004, p.232). This constraint is logically stronger than the normal diffeomorphism
constraint since it requires that our states be invariant under a much larger class of trans-
formations. We use the diff∗-constraint to define our s-knot states using the same recipe as
before (equation 2), yet the outcome is different. We begin with the gauge invariant states
(the spin-network states) and build equivalence classes of diff∗-related networks, and then
we map each equivalence class to a single vector in the dual space.
By removing the smoothness requirement at finitely many points, we are able to avoid
the trouble posed by nodes of high valence and broaden the number of networks identified
in a given equivalence class. The result of imposing the diff∗-constraint is that the number
of s-knots shrinks to a countable cardinality (Rovelli 2004, p.267). Thus, since the basis
vectors are the s-knot states, the s-knot Hilbert space is separable. Besides gaining a usable
Hilbert space, this new constraint removes the physical redundancies in our s-knot Hilbert
space.
We are justified in using the diff∗-constraint rather than the diffeomorphism constraint,
since all the states which satisfy the new constraint automatically satisfy the original
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constraint; as a result, no unphysical states are admitted.21 In applying the diff∗-constraint,
we have simply made the requirements for being a physical state more strict. One might be
concerned that in tightening the constraint, we will have squeezed out some of the physical
states. This need not worry us too much since all the states from the original Hilbert
space are found represented in the new Hilbert space. By applying the diff∗-constraint,
we have identified some old s-knot states by mapping them to a single state in the new
Hilbert space. Rather than squeezing out old states, the new constraint merely groups
some of them into a new equivalence class. Though the diff∗-constraint shrinks the size
of the Hilbert space by associating old s-knots states, it does not associate any two states
which our observables were able to distinguish. The old s-knots states which end up being
bundled together are those states which are physically identical from the perspective of our
observables and thereby, we do not remove states which might be required for representing
some physical possibility. We bundle up only those states which are representationally
redundant.
This completes my exposition of the theory of LQG. At different points in the ex-
position, I have explicitly endorsed the na¨ıve interpretation. Before considering other
interpretations, with competing ontologies, recall what the world is like given the na¨ıve in-
terpretation: spin-networks and s-knots live on a physical manifold and carry gravitational
charge along their links and nodes. The more charge a network has, the more volume it
produces. The networks of LQG build spacetime geometry one region at a time as geome-
try “radiates” from them (Figure 4). Since there is a lower bound to how much area and
volume a physical network can carry, spacetime can only be geometrically-parsed up to a
certain scale – below which, no geometry is defined.
Figure 4: A series of networks: gravitationally charged links and nodes. Each node defines a
volume of space and each link, an area.
The ontology of this interpretation is not so different from an equally na¨ıve interpre-
tation of GR. In GR, spacetime is described by 〈M, g〉 which we can interpret na¨ıvely as
describing a physically substantial manifold bearing a physical geometry. In moving to
na¨ıve-LQG, we keep the physically substantial manifold but replace the physical geometry,
21 Unphysical as determined by our original constraint.
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associated with the gravitational field and represented by g, with a quantum geometry,
produced by charged networks and represented by 〈s|.
By identifying s-knot states with diffeomorphically-smeared spin-networks, we can ex-
plain how area and volume come to be associated with diverse regions of the physical
manifold. The issue with spin-network states is that each state is associated with a sin-
gle physical network, and this network is nailed down to specific regions of the physical
manifold. If our physical network has a few nodes, then the physical manifold will have
only certain regions for which there are physical volume and area. It would be a strange
world we lived in if only some parts of spacetime had areas and volumes. It is important to
remember that each single state of our Hilbert space is supposed to represent the quantum
geometry of all of spacetime, and not merely some part of it. By smearing the network
over the entire manifold, s-knots are capable of producing areas and volumes across the
spacetime manifold.
Enough about the na¨ıve interpretation. Surely, according to the critic, M cannot
represent spacetime on its own? If M does not represent spacetime, then, as we shall see,
spacetime might disappear in LQG.
3 Spacetime disappears
In this section, I will provide seven additional interpretations of LQG, most of which do not
include spacetime in the ontology of LQG. Five of the seven differ from one another and
from the na¨ıve interpretation merely in what they take spacetime to be. I call four of these
interpretations ‘na¨ıve∗’, and the fifth I call ‘Rovellian.’ The final two interpretations are
different insofar as they explicitly or implicitly require that we formally modify LQG. The
sixth interpretation I call ‘trickle-down’ and the seventh ‘TaG.’ The following analysis will
center around whether or not some interpretations have spacetime and physical structures
called s-knots in their ontology. These are the two ontological questions which are at the
heart of this paper. Only by first understanding how and under which interpretations there
are s-knots and not spacetime fundamentally, can we analyze whether or not spacetime is
emergent from or composed of s-knots.
3.1 Na¨ıve∗-LQG
In the following, I will amend the na¨ıve interpretation to thicken the notion of spacetime
from being a structure literally modeled by the bare manifold M with no physical geo-
metric structure, to being a structure with some kind of geometry or quantum geometry.
Unlike the original na¨ıve interpretation, I will show that, according to some of the na¨ıve∗
interpretations, there is no spacetime in LQG. According to some of these interpretations,
there are physically substantial s-knots which are ontologically distinct from spacetime,
while in other interpretations there aren’t. The motivation for thickening our notion of
spacetime to include something like a metrical structure or physical geometry is that, with-
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out it, “spacetime” lacks features such as causes, spatial lengths, and durations of time
which seem to be constitutive of spacetime. Allow me to explain.
First, were spacetime to be bare and lack the physical structure encoded by g, which
I will often refer to as either ‘a physical metrical structure’ or ‘a physical geometry,’ then
spacetime would lack segments of spatial length and durations of time. Presumably, that
a bare physical manifold lacks spatial lengths and durations of time, is sufficient reason to
doubt that a bare physical manifold is spacetime at all. (In the following, I will say ‘bare
manifold.’) However, in case one needs more convincing, I will briefly show how certain
kinds of causes as well as other physical facts go missing when we treat M, absent g, as
representing spacetime. The following considerations are not exactly new and versions of
these ideas can be found in Lam and Esfeld (2013) as well as Isham and Butterfield (2011).
According to general relativity, causes are associated with either light-like or time-like
trajectories. This requirement forces all causal processes to stay within the light cone of
the putative cause. However, since light cones are defined using the metric g, without g,
M does not have a light cone structure. Without a light cone structure on M, we cannot
define such causal processes. In the context of LQG, one might not be concerned that a
bare manifold lacks GR-causes since, in the context of LQG, GR is no longer considered
a fundamental theory. Once out from under the thumb of GR, we may try to formulate a
theory of causation which is consistent with a bare manifold.
The trouble in trying to build an account of causation consistent with a bare manifold
is that without a physical metrical structure it’s unclear that spacetime contains a very
robust sense of change. And without change, in what sense are there causes? For example,
consider the broken window: yesterday the window was large, rectangular, and near the
book case, today the window lies in a pile of irregularly shaped small glass shards much
further from the book case. Standardly, the change in the state of the window would signal
some sort of cause, a baseball perhaps, responsible for the change. However, in a bare
manifold, since there are no lengths, there are no rectangles, no irregular shapes, no small,
no near, no far. Without the physical geometry encoded by g, the sense of change which
the world includes is incredibly reduced. Consequently, the kind and number of causes are
also reduced. Presumably, that causes are hard to pin down in a bare manifold is actually
not so much the issue as it is symptomatic of the fact that so much else has already gone
missing: length, duration, shape, size, speed, momentum, force, many kinds of energy,
much physical variation and most other physical features which are dependent, in some
way, on geometry. Given that so much physical structure is missing in a bare manifold, one
begins to doubt that M is sufficiently rich to model spacetime on its own. I do not claim
that the preceding considerations are sufficient reason for rejecting the na¨ıve interpretation
but raise these concerns only as motivation for looking beyond it.
Consequently, perhaps spacetime is better modeled by 〈M, g〉 or perhaps even by
〈M, 〈s|〉. The latter option should be read as claiming that spacetime is modeled by a
topological manifold bearing the quantum geometry of the s-knot named by 〈s|. In the
following, I will modify the na¨ıve interpretation in four ways in order to accommodate these
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two options. As I mentioned at the start of this paper, these interpretations will be less
na¨ıve, though still substantival. Finally, I do not claim that these four interpretations are
the only possible elaborations of the na¨ıve position. These interpretations simply provide
us with an interesting series of vantage points with which to interpret the mathematics of
LQG. As a warning, since I will be cycling through interpretations, I will also be cycling
through what ‘spacetime’ means, or how spacetime is represented by the interpretation.
For this reason, it is important to keep in mind which interpretation is being discussed.
The following na¨ıve∗ interpretations are named na¨ıvei (i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}).
According to the na¨ıve1 interpretation, spacetime is the composition of a substantival
manifold bearing a physical quantum geometry which we represent by the ordered pair
〈M, g〉. By defining spacetime as the composition of two things, I am implicitly treating
these things as representing physical objects or structures in their own right. However,
one need not adopt this position. Rather than treating M and g as representing physical
things which combine to form spacetime, one might instead understand spacetime to be
a “simple,” non-composite object represented by 〈M, g〉. By calling spacetime simple, I
do not mean to suggest that spacetime fails to have proper parts in terms of spacetime
regions or points, but rather that spacetime fails to have proper parts in terms of structures
represented byM and g. Thus, contrary to na¨ıve1, according to what I will call the na¨ıve2
interpretation, 〈M, g〉 represents a simple spacetime in so far as neither M nor g alone
represent anything physical.22 To be clear then, by definition, according to the na¨ıve2
interpretation, g does not represent the physical geometry of spacetime and M does not
represent the physical “basal” structure of spacetime. But rather, 〈M, g〉, as a unit,
represents a geometric-basal structure which we call spacetime. In the following, I will
unpack how the na¨ıf, of either variety, might update their belief regarding spacetime in
light of LQG.
If spacetime is as according to na¨ıve1, since there is no metrical structure described
by LQG, there is no spacetime according to na¨ıve1-LQG. It is likely that the na¨ıf of this
variety will interpret the structure 〈M, 〈s|〉 as representing a composite quantum spacetime:
M represents a substantival manifold and 〈s| represents a physically substantial network
responsible for the quantum geometry of quantum spacetime.
If spacetime is as according to na¨ıve2, since there is no metrical structure describe by
LQG, there is no spacetime according to na¨ıve2-LQG. However, since it is likely that the
na¨ıf2 will interpret the structure 〈M, 〈s|〉 as representing a simple quantum spacetime, then
there is only quantum spacetime and not also physically substantial networks represented
by 〈s|. By definition of what ‘simple’ means, in this context, it’s not the case that 〈M, 〈s|〉
represents a simple structure and 〈s| also represents a physical structure on its own.
The general motivation for the following two interpretations is the conviction that if
the physical model of LQG includes a four-dimensional basal manifold, then the physical
22 In different settings, M and g can represent whatever we want them to. The point here is simply that
if we interpret 〈M, g〉 as representing a simple structure, then these very same mathematical structures
M and g, in the context of LQG, cannot also represent distinct physical things.
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structure being represented is enough like a “container” for the substantivalist to think that
a spacetime lives on in LQG. According to substantivalists of this ilk, a spacetime is defined
to be that structure in which all physical objects exist, and that which allows objects to
both have “geometric” extension and to be “geometrically” related to one another. (Where
‘geometry’ refers to those physical properties modeled by either GR or LQG.) Substan-
tivalists, of the preceding variety, interpret 〈M, g〉 as representing a pseudo-Riemannian
spacetime and interpret 〈M, 〈s|〉 as representing a “quantum-Riemannian” spacetime.
According to the na¨ıve3 interpretation, spacetime is the composite of a substantival
manifold bearing a quantum geometry which we represent by the ordered pair 〈M, 〈s|〉.
According to this interpretation, spacetime, for obvious reasons, does not disappear in
LQG. Moreover, since spacetime is a composite, bothM and 〈s| represent physical things:
there is a substantival manifold with embedded networks which are responsible for the
quantum geometry of spacetime. The only significant difference between the na¨ıve1 and
na¨ıve3 interpretations is whether or not we require spacetime to be classical. Historically,
interpreters of quantum theory have usually opted for versions of the na¨ıve3,4-route. For
instance, one usually does not interpret the result of quantizing the electromagnetic field
as having removed the field from our physical theory. But rather, the usual interpretation
is that the physical field has simply gained its proper quantum description. This is the
spirt behind the na¨ıve3,4 interpretations: spacetime does not disappear in LQG, it just
gains its proper quantum description. The difference between the na¨ıve3 and the na¨ıve4
interpretations lies merely in whether or not we take spacetime to be simple or composite
in the sense previously discussed.
According to the na¨ıve4 interpretation, spacetime is a simple, non-composite structure
represented by 〈M, 〈s|〉. In this case, as previously discussed, since spacetime is simple,
neither M nor 〈s| represent anything physical on their own. In particular, the states 〈s|
do not represent physical things called s-knots but rather these states simply provide some
of the requisite mathematical structure for representing the quantum geometric relations
between physical structures. As a unit, 〈M, 〈s|〉 represents spacetime according to na¨ıve4-
LQG, just as 〈M, g〉, as a unit, represents spacetime according to na¨ıve2-LQG. Importantly,
according to both the na¨ıf2 and the na¨ıf4, there are no physical structures represented by
the states 〈s|, but only (quantum) spacetime represented by 〈M, 〈s|〉. If we want to think
about physical networks which exist somewhat independently of (quantum) spacetime, we
need opt for the original na¨ıve interpretation or the na¨ıve1 and na¨ıve3 interpretations.
Because the preceding claim is essential for understanding what might be the ontology of
LQG, I will repeat the claim in a slightly different manner. If we think that there are
physical things called spin-networks (s-knots) and also some other physical thing called
spacetime or quantum-spacetime, then we must not interpret 〈M, 〈s|〉 as representing a
simple, non-composite structure.
One might object that, despite my claims to the contrary, the states 〈s| can play dual
roles in the above “simple” interpretations. According to this objection, 〈s| partakes in
representing the simple structure 〈M, 〈s|〉 and also represents physically substantial s-knots
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in the physical manifold. However, if 〈s| picks out physically substantial networks, then it
seems as though the simple structure 〈M, 〈s|〉 can be conceived to have parts: one of those
parts being the physically substantial networks represented by 〈s|. There might be a subtle
way to conceive of 〈M, 〈s|〉 as being simple eventhough 〈s| also represents something on
its own; however, since I am unable express this possibility without equivocating or merely
insisting that it is the case, I will not attempt to develop this interpretation.
I have introduced the simple interpretations as a means of highlighting the dependence
of physically substantial s-knots on a composite interpretation of (quantum) spacetime.
In order for there to be physical networks distinct from (quantum) spacetime itself which
somehow partake in structuring (quantum) spacetime, we need to conceive of (quantum)
spacetime as composite.
All told, there are four less-na¨ıve interpretations of spacetime and these possibilities
map the four possible answers to questions 1. and 2. from §1: does spacetime disappear
in LQG, and are there s-knots in the ontology of LQG? In summary:
• According to the original na¨ıve interpretation, the manifoldM, devoid of any metrical
structure, represents substantival spacetime. Spacetime does not disappear in LQG,
and there are physically substantial s-knots. Spacetime on this view does not require
any particular physical geometry.
• According to the na¨ıve1 interpretation, M, devoid of any metrical structure, rep-
resents a substantial pre-spatiotemporal manifold. Since substantival spacetime, on
this view, is represented by 〈M, g〉, spacetime disappears in LQG. It’s reasonable to
suppose that a naif of this variety will endorse a composite interpretation of 〈M, 〈s|〉
as describing quantum spacetime. Spacetime, within this view, requires a classical
physical geometry, and quantum spacetime requires a quantum geometry. In any
case, since quantum spacetime is composite, there are physically substantial s-knots
represented by 〈s| which are embedded in the substantival manifold represented by
M.
• According to the na¨ıve2 interpretation, substantival spacetime is a non-composite
structure represented by 〈M, g〉 and fails to be described in LQG. It’s reasonable
to suppose that a naif of this variety will endorse a non-composite interpretation of
〈M, 〈s|〉 as describing a substantival quantum spacetime. Since quantum spacetime
is simple, in the manner described, quantum spacetime does not have physical parts
represented by either M or 〈s|.
• According to the na¨ıve3 interpretation, substantival spacetime is a composite struc-
ture represented by 〈M, 〈s|〉. Since spacetime is composite, the states 〈s| represent
physical networks embedded in the substantival manifold represented by M.
• According to the na¨ıve4 interpretation, substantival spacetime is a non-composite
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structure represented by 〈M, 〈s|〉 and, as such, spacetime exists in LQG, though
substantival s-knots do not.
The theory of LQG neither entails that spacetime disappears, nor that there are physical
networks. Whether or not there are such things depends on our interpretation of the theory
and, in particular, our interpretation of M and its relation to spacetime. In order to keep
this discussion of ontology from degenerating into a verbal debate, we must specify ahead
of time what we take spacetime to be. The philosophical import of this discussion has
nothing to do with which mathematical structures get to be labeled ‘spacetime,’ but it has
everything to do with what physical structures we take to be essential for spacetime. If
we understand spacetime to be essentially that physical structure described by either the
na¨ıve1 or na¨ıve2 interpretations, then, if LQG is true, there is no spacetime fundamentally.
However, if we take physical spacetime to be, more generically, that substantival structure
in the world partially responsible for some of our “geometrical” experiences then, if LQG
is true, we will naturally update our beliefs about that structure and adopt something like
the na¨ıve, na¨ıve3, or na¨ıve4 descriptions of spacetime.
Though spacetime might disappear in LQG, it disappears in the same sense that the
classical electromagnetic field disappears in quantum field theory. In place of spacetime
qua 〈M, g〉, LQG provides a structure described by 〈M, 〈s|〉. The difference between these
two structures is only in the geometric predictions derived from them. In particular, the
quantum geometry predicted by LQG and contrary to GR, is discrete and suitably fuzzy.
The geometry is fuzzy in two senses: first, as will be explained in §3.2, the geometric
shapes associated with weave states will never be sharply Riemannian. Second, since a
generic s-knot state is not a weave state, rather than describing areas and volumes which
look Riemannian in the classical regime, a generic s-knot state describes a superposition
of areas and volumes. How these generic s-knot states come to be associated with the
phenomenological world is the big question underlying all instances of the measurement
problem. If having a fuzzy quantum-geometric structure entails that spacetime has gone
missing in LQG, then so be it; however, one must not think that the disappearance of
spacetime, in this sense, is any stranger than the disappearance of any other classical
structure when adopting a quantum theory.
One might object that, by proposing the na¨ıve3 and na¨ıve4 interpretations, I am not
taking seriously enough the fuzzy physical geometry described by 〈s|. In essence, this is
the same concern which I considered when discussing what goes missing were we to treat
spacetime as being modeled by M alone. There, I argued that since much of what we
take spacetime to be goes missing if spacetime were bare, it would not be spacetime after
all. For similar reasons, perhaps the structure described by 〈M, 〈s|〉 is not very much like
spacetime after all. For example, since a generic s-knot state describes a quantum super-
position of geometric structure, spatial lengths are generically described as a superposition
of (roughly) classical lengths, Moreover, a similar description applies to durations of time,
speed, momentum, electric flux and everything else which we have assumed to rely on the
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physical geometry of spacetime.23 In short, the quantum fuzziness described by generic
s-knot states leaks into the rest of the world. Can this fuzzy structure really be spacetime?
This question is not whether or not spacetime can be recovered from this fuzzy structure,
but whether or not spacetime should be identified with it. Is spacetime fuzzy? There comes
a point when so much has been lost from what we take spacetime to be, or how we expect
physical objects to relate to spacetime, that we must let go of the concept altogether, or so
the objection goes. In general, I am sympathetic to this objection, though I will note one
important caveat. As discussed above, a substantivalist might regard the fact that 〈M, 〈s|〉
can be interpreted substantivally, as evidence that the spirit of spacetime lives on in LQG.
In other words, a substantivalist might require that for spacetime to disappear, we need
the substantival “container” to disappear. This concern will be addressed to some extent
in §3.3. Before moving beyond the na¨ıve∗ interpretations, I need to clarify one further
point.
According to the original na¨ıve interpretation, the vector states of LQG represent phys-
ically substantival s-knots. However, since there are no physically substantial s-knots ac-
cording the na¨ıve2 and na¨ıve4 interpretations, what do the states of the theory represent?
According to these interpretation, (quantum) spacetime is non-composite and modeled by
the ordered pair 〈M, 〈s|〉; consequently, the states of LQG describe different configurations
of spacetime itself. In general, for interpretations which do not admit s-knots in their ontol-
ogy, the states of LQG describe either different configurations of spacetime or of quantum
spacetime. In order to streamline the following discussion, I will choose the latter locution.
The three interpretations to which I will now turn, diverge much more radically from
the na¨ıve interpretation than do the na¨ıve∗ interpretations. According to the Rovellian in-
terpretation, the manifoldM is a mathematical artifact and does not encode any physical
information; spacetime, according to this interpretation, is only the gravitational field. Ac-
cording to TaG interpretations,M does encode physical information relevant for spacetime
but, as a result, we ought to provide a quantum description for it as well. TaG-LQG di-
verges from the na¨ıve interpretations in providing, or attempting to provide, a quantization
of the spacetime manifold by way of its treatment of M. Similarly, according to trickle-
down interpretations, M encodes physical information relevant for spacetime. However,
unlike TaG, according to trickle-down interpretations, the manifold is thought to be auto-
matically quantized under the standard formulation of LQG. Trickle-down interpretations
diverge from na¨ıve interpretations insofar as they interpret the effects of quantizing the
metric field as trickling down and affecting the base manifoldM.24 Both TaG and trickle-
down interpretations are far more programmatic and less well understood than either the
23 Similarly, Isham and Butterfield note that by replacing g with a suitably quantized alternative, the
quantum geometry associated with (quantum) spacetime will not include a stable light cone structure
but a superposition of light cones/ causal structures (2001, p. 54, 64).
24 Technically, the metric g is quantized in canonical quantum gravity and the vector potentialA is quantized
in LQG. The difference between these approaches is mostly mathematical since the metric g can be written
in terms of “tetrad fields” which are defined by A.
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na¨ıve or Rovellian approaches to LQG. As a result, my account of these interpretations
will be proportionally less complete.
3.2 Rovellian LQG
The following interpretation is largely inspired by the words and works of Carlo Rovelli;
however, I do not claim that the views expressed here are exactly his own. Thus, this
interpretation is Rovellian, though perhaps not Rovelli’s. According to the Rovellian inter-
pretation, the diffeomorphism freedom found in GR is evidence thatM is a gauge artifact
and does not represent a physically substantial manifold (Rovelli 1997, 2004). In fact, this
rejection of the substantival manifold is often how diffeomorphisms are employed by those
wielding Einstein’s infamous hole argument.
Importantly, the diffeomorphism invariance of GR is found recapitulated in the theory of
LQG in the form of the scalar and vector constraints. As explained in §2.1, these constraints
require that our states be constant in time and across variations of space. However, it turns
out, that even more than this is the case: as we saw in §2.4, the observables of the theory
are also moduli-invariant. This is important since if the observables were not, they would
treat two different embeddings of a single algebraic network differently.25 If these two
embeddings produced physically distinct effects (e.g. if the geometry they produced was
distinct), then the manifold would show itself in a physically salient way. However, that
is not true; according to Rovelli, two different embeddings of the same algebraic graph
produce the same geometry. Thus, since the manifold is invisible to the observables of
LQG, Rovelli concludes:
In fact M (the spacetime manifold) has no physical interpretation, it is just a
mathematical device, a gauge artifact... There are not spacetime points at all.
The Newtonian notions of space and time have disappeared... the spacetime
coordinates ~x and t have no physical meaning...
(2004, p.74)
What Newton called “space,” and Minkowski called “spacetime,” is unmasked:
it is nothing but a dynamical object – the gravitational field...
...the gravitational field is the same entity as spacetime.
(2004, p.9, 18)
According to Rovelli, the diffeomorphism invariance of GR and LQG imply that M plays
no role in determining values of our physical observables, and Rovelli concludes that M
is a gauge artifact and ought not be reified.26 However, just because M does not play a
25 Assuming that the network includes a node of sufficiently high valence.
26 It is unclear how literal we should interpret Rovelli’s repudiation of M as bearing any physical salience.
It seems that, at minimum, the global topology of “space” Σ has bearing on what our experiences of the
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role in determining what physical values are observed does not require that we treatM as
being a mathematical artifact. How to treat gauge orbits is a thorny philosophical issue,
and it is far from settled that all such orbits ought to be taken non-realistically.27 Rovelli
himself recognizes this, in “Halfway Through the Woods” (1997) he acknowledges that
though LQG and GR are manifold-invariant, one might still insist that there is a physical
background manifold which happens to be unobservable. Though Rovelli acknowledges
that the existence of an unobservable manifold is logically possible, it it not the position he
endorses. According to the Rovellian interpretation presented here and assumed in Rovelli
(2004), there is no physical manifold represented by M.
Since, according to Rovelli, spacetime is just the gravitational field, in quantizing the
gravitational field, we quantize spacetime itself (Rovelli 2004, p.17). Since there is no
classical gravitational field in LQG, there is no classical spacetime either. However, since
the weave states reproduce classical geometry at classical scales, equations (12) and (13),
there is a sense in which spacetime arises or is recovered from the quantum phenomena of
LQG. When (l lp) and the quantum geometry, or quantum spacetime, is described by a
weave state of the theory, the world looks classical. In these cases, we can use GR and g
to model some features of the world. In this way, we might say that spacetime is recovered
from LQG in the classical regime. However, we must not interpret claims to the effect
that spacetime is recovered, in this sense, as necessitating that spacetime, as a new item
of ontology, arises in the classical regime. When ‘recovered’ is understood in this way, all
that is required is that spacetime, the classical gravitational field, be an effective structure.
One might endorse the additional view according to which effective structures are genuine
objects of our ontology and distinct in kind from whatever happens to be fundamental.
Or, one might view effective structures as merely useful fictions. My argument here is only
to note that under Rovellian-LQG there is a sense in which spacetime is recovered from
LQG where ‘recovered’ does not necessitate that there actually be such objects.
Much of what I have just said regarding Rovelli’s position can be modified and applied
to some of the na¨ıve∗ interpretations. In particular, according to both na¨ıve1-LQG and
na¨ıve2-LQG, classical spacetime can be recovered in exactly the same way as it is for Rovelli:
when the states 〈s| are weave states, the physical geometry of LQG can be effectively
modeled by 〈M, g〉 when (l  lp). In this way, classical spacetime can be recovered from
LQG according to these interpretations. Or more perspicuously, if our na¨ıve interpretation
includes physically substantial s-knots, as in na¨ıve1-LQG, classical spacetime is recovered
when the physically substantial s-knots come to be described by the weave states of the
theory.
Though there is neither a spacetime manifold nor spacetime geometry according to
Rovellian-LQG, only the latter is a result of the quantum theory. The spacetime manifold
world is like. For instance, if Σ is compact (i.e. has a dimension which is rolled up like a three-dimensional
cylinder), then our theory of (quantum) spacetime should predict that we could travel a finite distance
in one direction and come back to where we started.
27 See, Healey (2009) for a discussion of the issues involved in interpreting gauge variables and orbits.
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disappears in Rovellian-LQG for the same reason that it disappears in Rovellian-GR: in
one way or another, each theory is diffeomorphically invariant.
Given that the world does not include a physically substantial manifold, according to
Rovellian-LQG, the world also does not include physically substantial networks, at least
as they have defined throughout this essay. Physically embedded spin-networks and s-
knots are physically substantial insofar as they are comprised of points from the physical
manifold.28 This argument: that there are no physically realistic networks since there is no
physical manifold, is not an argument which Rovelli makes. However, I will assume that,
for Rovelli, there are no physically substantial networks, and I will interpret the following
statement, as Rovelli saying as much:
Such geometrical pictures [of geometric networks] are helps for the intuition,
but there is no microscopic geometry at the Planck scale and these pictures
should not be taken too literally in my opinion. (Rovelli 2011, p.4)
Additionally Rovelli (2004, p.268-269), describes spacetime like a shirt which, when ap-
proached, reveals an underlying weave of threads. However, Rovelli cautions against taking
these weaves “as a realistic proposal for the microstates of a given macroscopic geometry
[spacetime]” (p.269). Indeed, for Rovelli, there is no shirt since there is no basal structure,
there are only “fields on fields” (2004, p.9) or rather fields ‘on’ fields.29 I interpret these
quotes from Rovelli as cautioning us against na¨ıvely reifying networks in M. The world
does not really contain gravitationally charged points and lines which are responsible for
the macroscopic geometry of the world. In fact, I take it that this is the reason why Rovelli
refers to s-knots as being “abstract” (§2.2).
According to Rovelli, the physically salient aspects of s-knots are algebraic and inde-
pendent of the manifold altogether. Given their independence of the manifold, we might as
well associate s-knots not with [|Γ(~x), jn, im〉], but with [|Γ, jn, im〉] which I have been call-
ing algebraic networks. I take it then that when Rovelli refers to s-knots as being abstract
and not in space, that he intends to signal two distinct things: (1) there is no spacetime
as represented by M, and (2) the physically salient mathematical structures of LQG are
algebraic, not geometric.
A note of caution: I am using ‘geometry’ in at least two distinct ways. There is the
physical geometry given by specifying a metric or an s-knot state, and then there is the
geometry of points and lines which we use in constructing the networks in M. In saying
that the networks are not to be taken in a geometrically-literal way, the Rovellian is only
cautioning against reifying the points and lines of the network. For instance, consider the
two levels of geometry contained in Figure 4 (§2.4). This figure contains the geometric
28 By calling the points, ‘spacetime points,’ I do not thereby claim that the bare physical manifold is
spacetime.
29 Rovelli does not explain what fields, qua physical objects, are. Are fields extended objects, are they
composed of field-points and if so, in which ways are physical fields different from a substantival manifold?
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graph of the spin-network, as well as the geometry of the cubic volume and square areas.
According to the Rovellian, only the volume and areas associated with the network are
to be taken seriously. Neither the lines and points of the graph, nor the shapes denoting
the volume and areas, are to be interpreted “ontologically.” In particular, that the volume
is represented as a cube and that the areas are represented as square, are artifacts of the
image. I do not have space in this article to discuss these ideas fully, but, in general, the
information provided by a network is not enough to fully specify all the angles between
adjacent surfaces which define a volume or area. Thus, shapes associated with the networks
of LQG have quantum indeterminacy built into them. Since some of the angles are left
undetermined, the shape is fuzzy and cannot be represented as being euclidean, as I have
done in Figure 4. For more on these issues see Rovelli and Vidotto (2015).
If geometric spin-networks and s-knots are like the manifold M and fail to refer to
substantival links and nodes in the world, what role do they play? According to the Rov-
ellian interpretation, spin-networks and s-knots are mathematical tools useful for encoding
the properties of quantized spacetime. According to this view, state-vectors which live in
our Hilbert space, networks which live on M, and Γ (networks in some algebraic space),
are all merely mathematical structures which encode the geometric properties of quantum
spacetime. Both the vector states of LQG and the embedded structures, represent quan-
tum geometric properties of quantum spacetime in terms of the algebraic information they
contain. Consequently, no part of a geometric network, not an isolated point or line, is to
be taken as physically salient on its own. The network, as a whole, is physically salient
insofar as it maps to a vector state in the Hilbert space of LQG.30
By repudiating the substantival manifold and by quantizing the gravitational field,
Rovellian-LQG is a form of relational quantum spacetime. However, since Rovelli does not
say much regarding his relationism (2004, p.77-79), I wilI refrain (mostly) from associating
any particular flavor of relationism to Rovellian-LQG.31 Rather than associating a particu-
lar flavor of relationism to Rovellian-LQG, I will leave this particular feature open and will
stipulate that however 〈M, g〉 is interpreted as describing a relational spacetime in GR,
that we import this interpretational stance to LQG and regard 〈M, 〈s|〉 as describing rela-
tional quantum spacetime.32 By leaving an interpretational variable open, Rovellian-LQG
30 Caveat: some sub-networks can be treated as being physically meaningful, but only because if we were to
extract them from their network, they too would have a copy of themselves in the Hilbert space of LQG.
Such networks are not physically meaningful as proper parts of a network, but are physically meaningful
as extracted networks in their own right.
31 See Earman (1989) for different flavors of substantivalism and relationism. Moreover, since it’s possible
to deny substantivalism and not be a relationalist (Earman, 1979) and since Rovelli has not provided
a worked-out metaphysics of (quantum) spatio-temporal relations and how they constitute quantum
spacetime, perhaps Rovelli’s position is more “non-substantival” than relational.
32 Some kinds of relationist accounts of GR might also require there to be matter fields before there is
spacetime. For instance, if one interprets g as only encoding the spatio-temporal relations between
material objects, then, without material objects, all we have is a relation and presumably no spacetime.
However, for Rovelli, g encodes more than spatio-temporal relations, g is a physical field in its own right
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is not a single relational interpretation of quantum spacetime, but a schema for generating
various relational interpretations. Depending on how the relationism is fleshed out, the
Rovellian will interpret different s-knot states as representing different relational quantum
spacetimes.
One might object that I have omitted an important interpretation of LQG and of s-knot
states in particular. Under na¨ıve-LQG and certain version of na¨ıve*-LQG, s-knot states
represent physically substantival networks in a physically substantial manifold. One might
wonder why I have not considered the analogous relationist interpretation whereby s-knot
states represent physically relational networks in a relational spacetime? The reason I
have not discussed this interpretive option is that I am not convinced that the suggestion
is coherent. In particular, I am not convinced that on a relationist account, there can be
a distinction between what the states represent: (a) relational quantum spacetime and (b)
some other things called “relational networks.” In the case of Rovellian-relationism, what
the states represent is relational spacetime and not some conceptually distinct middle man.
The reason that the na¨ıve, na¨ıve1, and na¨ıve3-interpretations coherently distinguish
between what s-knot states represent (physically substantial networks) and a physically
substantial spacetime, is because they interpret spacetime as a composite and interpret
M substantivally. In the case of na¨ıve-LQG, the substantival structure is spacetime and
according to na¨ıve1 and na¨ıve3-LQG, M represents a pre-spatio-temporal substantival
manifold. In any case, that there is a physically substantial structure independent of
the s-knot states, is what creates the conceptual space for physically substantial s-knots.
In the case of relational space-time, what plays the analogous role to the substantival
interpretation ofM? Or, in other words, if s-knot states do represent physically-relational
s-knots, what is relational spacetime and what represents it in our mathematical model?33
I cannot rule out the possibility that there is a coherent interpretation of LQG whereby
there are physically relational networks which live in a relational spacetime, but due to my
inability to formulate a coherent instance of such an interpretation, I will not consider it.
In the following, I will continue to assume that if there are physical networks distinct from
spacetime or quantum spacetime, that these networks are physically substantival.
3.3 Manifold quantization
In this section, I will address both the TaG (topology and geometry) and trickle-down
interpretations since they both “quantize” the manifold. In just a moment, I will indicate,
as best as possible, what ‘quantize’ means in this context. However, as I mentioned at the
start of this paper, these two interpretations are far more programmatic than serious or
well developed versions of LQG; as such, I will not attempt to explain in very great detail
(Rovelli 2004, p.77). That being the case, 〈M, g〉 might not require other physical fields in order to be a
model of relational spacetime.
33 One might attempt to interpret M relationally, though I have serious doubts that this can be done in a
convincing way.
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how the manifold is quantized, but I will merely indicate what it might mean for spacetime
and s-knots if it were “quantized.” In short, since TaG and trickle-down interpretations
replace the manifold M with a “quantum” basal structure Mˆ, the physical structure
described by these interpretations is that much more foreign and that much less spatio-
temporal. Moreover, in replacing M with Mˆ, the na¨ıf cannot interpret the theory as
including physically substantial s-knots, at least as s-knots have been constructed thus far.
According to the substantival interpretations considered in this paper, M plays an
essential role in representing a substantival basal structure. Within some interpretations,
the manifold M is interpreted as representing a substantival structure on its own (either
spacetime or pre-spatio-temporal); whereas, according to other interpretations, M is a
required component for what ends up representing a substantival structure (either space-
time or quantum spacetime). Moreover, what makes Rovellian-LQG non-substantival is
precisely the repudiation of M as being physically significant. For the sake of argument
then, let me stipulate more generally that M is essential for encoding whatever might be
substantival about spacetime. If this is correct, then the TaG and trickle-down interpreta-
tions are philosophically novel insofar as they describe a theory in which the substantival
features of spacetime are “quantized.” The point is, if our model replaces M with a fuzzy
background structure “Mˆ,” it is harder to see that there is something like a substantival
“container” in which physical things are and dynamical processes occur. This is not to
say that one cannot interpret Mˆ substantivally and is merely to note that unlike M, Mˆ,
might not model anything like a container. For instance, according to Crowther, spacetime
is replaced by a “cloud of lattices” (2014, p.247).
According to TaG versions of LQG, the topology and geometry (TaG) of classical
spacetime 〈M, g〉 are explicitly replaced by some suitably quantized versions. The impe-
tus behind TaG-LQG is a desire for a more radically background-independent theory of
quantum gravity. How one goes about “quantizing” M however, is far from clear. In gen-
eral, what quantization means in this context is distinct from what it means according to
Dirac’s quantization procedure. Moreover, as Isham (1991) notes, since M is a composite
structure consisting of a set of points, topology, and differential structure, one has many
options for which structures to quantize in quantizingM. For instance, according to Dus-
ton’s version of TaG (2012), certain topological features of the manifold are appended to
the spin-network states by adding a new internal degree of freedom. Though both Isham
and Duston have developed programs to quantize the topological structure of M, one
could instead attempt to quantize M through its differential structures or by discretizing
the manifold’s base set of points. In any case, however one goes about “quantizing”M, in
addition to g, the states of TaG-LQG represent physically distinct configurations of 〈Mˆ, gˆ〉:
a quantum-spatio-temporal structure in all its manifold glories.
Regarding trickle-down interpretations, I intend for this interpretive-scheme to capture
any and all interpretations under which the quantization of the gravitational field is thought
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to automatically affect a discretization of the base manifold.34 For instance, according to
Isham and Butterfield, the discrete spectrum of the area and volume observables (§2.3)
suggests that the physical basal structure of spacetime or quantum spacetime is “logically
weaker” than a physical continuum (2001, p.78). I do not pretend to understand how trickle
down effects work, and my purpose here is not to provide an account of such effects. The
point in discussing this interpretive option is merely to highlight its ontology: whatever
basal structure there is, the world is structurally impoverished in comparison to that which
is described by M. Of course, this is the same result obtained under TaG-LQG. The
only significant difference between TaG and trickle-down interpretations is whether or not
quantizing the metric field automatically requires that the base manifold be quantized or
whether this quantization needs to be imposed on the theory by some other means. In
either case, if M is replaced by Mˆ the world being described by LQG is that much less
like the spacetime of GR. Consequently, even if we were to adopt a na¨ıve attitude toward
these interpretations, we would not conclude that the ontology of the theory includes
a physically substantial manifold, or perhaps anything which might be interpreted as a
substantival container. Moreover, if there is no physically substantial manifold, we will not
interpret LQG as including physically substantial s-knots. Allow me to explain.
“Quantizing” the manifold M will affect the mathematical networks embedded in it
and, thereby, will affect what the na¨ıf takes the world to be like. Since the na¨ıf interprets
mathematical structures fairly literally, he will interpret the world as including “quan-
tized” substantival s-knots and not the classical substantival s-knots assumed hitherto.
What quantum substantival s-knots are, will depend on how exactly M is quantized. For
instance, if the manifold is quantized by “summing over” all possible discretizations of the
manifold, then the na¨ıve ontology of this theory would include a fuzzy, discrete, substantival
base and yet no s-knots, at least not as they have been defined. Perhaps the substanti-
val networks of this basal structure are superpositions of discretized s-knots? I have no
reason to think that the states of either TaG or trickle-down-LQG describe anything like
a “〈fuzzy, discrete, substantival base; superposition of discretized s-knots〉.” The point is
simply that in quantizing the manifold, we simultaneously carve away at the substantival-
ist’s container and cut ourselves off from being able to interpret the theory as including
physically substantival s-knots.
The TaG and trickle-down interpretations are of special interest, since they push di-
rectly up against the substantivalist’s intuitions. The container, which the substantivalist
takes M to represent, is explicitly given a quantum description in TaG and trickle-down
interpretations. How, or in which ways, Mˆ is able to be interpreted substantivally will de-
pend on how, and in which ways, M is quantized. In any event, it is unlikely that 〈Mˆ, gˆ〉
or 〈Mˆ, 〈s|〉 describes a physical structure alike enough to what we mean by ‘spacetime’ for
even the na¨ıf to think that spacetime, or a close kin, exists fundamentally in LQG.
34 For a general discussion of this idea, see Isham and Butterfield (2001), Isham (1991) as well as Norton
(2015).
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4 Concluding remarks and challenges
Throughout this account, I have considered eight interpretations of LQG: five na¨ıve inter-
pretations, as well as the Rovellian, TaG, and trickle-down interpretations. Most of these
interpretations do not include physically substantial s-knots in their ontology, and some do
include spacetime. Thus, claims to the effect that spacetime is composed of or is emergent
from spin-networks (s-knots) depend rather acutely on our interpretation. Presumably, if
spin-networks compose spacetime, then there must not be a thing called spacetime fun-
damentally and there must be physical things called spin-networks. I will use this section
to provide an analysis of some of the claims which I quoted at the start of this paper.
In particular, I will argue that, for many interpretations, spacetime is not composed of or
built from physically substantial s-knots and that when spacetime is composed of physically
substantial s-knots, they compose spacetime only “weakly,” which I will explain.
Following the analysis of whether or not, and in what sense, spacetime might be com-
posed of or built from spin-networks, I will briefly discuss Huggett and Wu¨thrich’s account
of spacetime emergence. I will explain how, for these authors, emergence does not require
a physical object called spacetime to emerge from some other physical object (a spin-
network). I will conclude from these two discussions that the claims quoted at the start of
this paper are hard to make true when taken literally and are of limited ontological import
when suitably interpreted. This is not to say that there is something wrong or missing
from the works which contain such claims. Rather, those works simply have different goals
from the ontological focus of this work. I will close this paper by noting how this discussion
of ontology might affect related topics in the philosophical foundations of LQG.
4.1 Spacetime is composed of or constructed out of spin-networks
In this section I will analyze claims to the effect that spacetime is composed of or con-
structed out of spin-networks by placing these claims in the context of three very different
interpretations of LQG. The idea is that by considering the claim “spacetime is composed
of spin-networks” under three very different interpretations, we might then generalize to
some of the other interpretations. In the following I will translate claims of the preceding
kind from being about spin-networks to being about s-knots since the proper ontological
unit in LQG are s-knots and indeed claims in the literature which are putatively about
spin-networks are often really claims about s-knots. Again, this is merely a matter of lan-
guage and the fact that there is, as yet, no standard vocabulary for LQG.
Case 1:
If we endorse the na¨ıve3 interpretation, then s-knots compose spacetime though only in a
technical sense. S-knots “compose” spacetime insofar as spacetime is defined to be that
physical structure represented by 〈M, 〈s|〉, and insofar as there are physical things called
s-knots. In other words, s-knots compose spacetime since we need 〈s| for our model of
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spacetime. Moreover, since this interpretation takes for granted a physically substantial
manifold, it is not the case that s-knots compose all aspects of spacetime. S-knots, in this
situation, merely provide the missing link for spacetime. With the inclusion of s-knots,
the physical manifold gains the quantum geometric properties which we have required of
spacetime. Since s-knots do not compose all aspects of spacetime, I will say that s-knots
weakly compose spacetime. This is not a very interesting kind of composition for indeed,
the classical gravitational field weakly composes spacetime in GR.
Case 2:
If we endorse the na¨ıve1 interpretation, then s-knots weakly compose an effective space-
time. According to this interpretation, spacetime includes a physical geometry, essentially
described by a pseudo-Riemannian metric. Since the world, according to LQG, is never
exactly described by a pseudo-Riemannian metric, there is no spacetime fundamentally in
LQG. Although, when an s-knot comes to take the form described by some weave state
of the theory, we can pretend, in certain regards (equations 12, and 13) and in certain
regimes (l  lp), that that world is pseudo-Riemannian. In this way, s-knots build an
effective spacetime (i.e. quantum geometry looks classical sometimes.) However, as was
the case under the na¨ıve3 interpretation, this form of composition is again weak since not
all aspects of what we take spacetime to be, are composed of s-knots (e.g. the manifold is
not composed of s-knots).
Case 3:
According to the Rovellian interpretation, spacetime is not literally composed of s-knots
for two reasons. First, according to the Rovellian, there are no physically substantial
networks (for why this is so, see §3.2). Second, since the Rovellian defines spacetime to
be the classical gravitational field, and since there is no classical gravitational field in
LQG, fundamentally then there is no spacetime. Rather than saying that s-knots compose
spacetime, the Rovellian might instead claim that when quantum spacetime comes to take
a form described by a weave state, we can approximate LQG with a classical spacetime,
e.g. with a classical gravitational field. Thus, spacetime is an effective structure according
to the Rovellian. There are no substantival networks from which spacetime is effectively
composes but rather, quantum spacetime merely comes to look classical.
Thus, as these cases illustrate, it is not straightforwardly the case that spacetime is
composed from or constructed out of s-knots. The closest we get to s-knots, in some literal
sense, composing spacetime is in terms of weak or effective composition. In the following,
I will briefly discuss Huggett and Wu¨thrich’s account of spacetime emergence. As we shall
see, these authors might not be making an ontological claim about new kinds of objects
coming to exist.
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4.2 Spacetime emerges from spin-networks
According to Huggett and Wu¨thrich, “the spacetime structure emerges from appropriately
benign, i.e. semi-classical, spin-networks” (2013, p.279). Presumably, according to these
authors, spacetime is not as described by the na¨ıve, na¨ıve3 or na¨ıve4 interpretations. Ac-
cording to these interpretations, spacetime is fundamental to the theory of LQG and is in
no need of emergence.
According to the remaining interpretations, spacetime is essentially related to the phys-
ical geometry described by g. Since there is no such geometry in LQG, then there is no
spacetime fundamentally. As a reminder, both na¨ıve2 and Rovellian-LQG do not include
physically substantial spin-networks (s-knots) as objects in their ontology (§3.1, 3.2). Con-
sequently, if either of these interpretations are what Huggett and Wu¨thrich have in mind,
and they might not, then whatever emergence amounts to, must not require that there
actually be physically substantial spin-networks. As it turns out, Huggett and Wu¨thrich’s
account of emergence does not require that there actually be physical spin-networks.
According to Huggett and Wu¨thrich, when two theories satisfy a certain set of pre-
specified criteria, the theories (and perhaps some of their substructures) are said to stand
in the emergence relation (2013, p.280). Once the criterion is met and the theories stand in
an emergence relation, we say either that one theory is emergent from the other or that the
physically salient structures of one theory emerge from the physically salient structures of
the other. For instance, if GR and LQG satisfy the emergence relation, we might say that
GR emerges from LQG, or that spacetime “〈M, g〉” or perhaps g, emerges from quantum
spacetime “〈M, 〈s|〉” or perhaps from s-knots (Wu¨thrich 2006, §9.2). Importantly, though
Huggett and Wu¨thrich’s account of emergence requires that spacetime and spin-networks
be possible physical structures relevantly related to our experiences and modeled by our
theories in order to ground the claim that spacetime is an effective replacement for s-knots,
their account does not require that there actually be spacetime or spin-networks (2013,
p.284).35 Allow me to explain.
According to Huggett and Wu¨thrich, spacetime emergence, in the context of LQG,
includes two procedures:
The first procedure, an approximation in the sense of Butterfield and Isham
(1999,2001), should show how the dynamics forces the quantum state into
semi-classical states with a well-behaved classical counterpart such that, e.g.,
the quantum superposition is dominated by a single spin network. The sec-
ond, limiting, procedure then establishes the connection from the semi-classical
states to classical relativistic spacetime. (2013, p.280)
The approximating procedure mentioned here is a requirement on the dynamics of LQG to
force some generic superposition of s-knot states to take the form of a weave state (§2.3).
35 Here ‘effectivity’ is understood in terms of the predictive efficacy of theory given the structure in question,
〈M, g〉, for instance. This is the same sense of effective used throughout this essay.
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Once done, our authors require that there be some physically salient limiting procedure
whereby these weave states might reproduce the empirical content of relativistic spacetime.
This limiting procedure is at least partially satisfied by the weave states insofar as they
reproduce “the standard [psuedo-Riemannian] area and volume functions” of spatial regions
in the limit l  lp (p.279). Notably, neither condition (approximation or limit), require
that there actually be a classical relativistic spacetime in the regime l  lp; all that these
procedures require is that weaves states reproduce the physical geometry of a classical
spacetime. For more on this point, see §5.1.
Additionally, these procedures also do not require there to be physically substantial
spin-networks (s-knots). For instance, a Rovellian, whose interpretation does not include
physical networks, might interpret the aforementioned processes as requiring that relational
quantum spacetime, as represented by some s-knot state 〈s|, come to look like a relational
classical spacetime (a described by g) in the regime l  lp.36 According to the Rovellian,
using Wu¨thrich and Huggett’s criterion, classical spacetime emerges from quantum space-
time. This example serves to highlight that just because the states of LQG satisfy the
conditions as outlined by Huggett and Wu¨thrich, one cannot infer that there are physical
spin-networks (s-knots) from which spacetime emerges. In order for this additional claim to
hold, we need to adopt an interpretation which includes physical s-knots. Thus, in claiming
that spacetime emerges from the “coherent states of LQG,” one might be claiming that
there are physical s-knots and from these spacetime emerges. Or, one might merely be
claiming that quantum spacetime looks classical in certain regimes.
In sum, the quoted claims with which I began this paper, are of little aid for under-
standing the ontology of LQG: the nature of spacetime, and its relations the networks of
LQG. These claims are of little ontological aid since they are either not true when inter-
preted literally and, when true, they don’t say much about ontology. And then again, it
is unlikely that these claims were meant to provide any such aid, but rather these quotes
might be better read as providing general heuristics regarding technical results in LQG.
4.3 Conclusion
In the first half of this paper, I provided an exposition of LQG expressed in the language of
the na¨ıve interpretation. That interpretation describes the world as including a substan-
tival manifold called spacetime which contains spatially embedded charged graphs. These
charged graphs are responsible for the quantum geometric structure of spacetime. The
second half of this paper consisted of an analysis of alternative interpretations of LQG.
These interpretations differ from one another and the original na¨ıve interpretation in what
they take spacetime to be and, consequently, what they take the states of the theory to
represent.
As I have argued, whether or not spacetime disappears in LQG depends upon how one
interpretsM and how essential a pseudo-Riemannian geometry is for spacetime. What goes
36 This in fact is exactly what the Rovellian does say in the form of “recovering” classical spacetime (§3.2).
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missing in LQG, independent of one’s interpretation, is the physical geometry described by
g; whether or not spacetime also goes missing is up for debate. Finally, I have provided an
analysis of some claims to the effect that spacetime is either composed of or emergent from
spin-networks (s-knots) and have argued that, more often than not, these claims cannot
be and perhaps are not meant to be interpreted in an ontologically serious sense.
4.4 Afterword: related issues and looking forward
The foregoing analysis will affect other issues in the literature on LQG: the problem of
time, the status of locality in LQG, the nature of emergence and of causation in LQG,
as well as the distinction between abstract and concrete objects. In this final section, I
will only discuss, albeit very briefly, how LQG affects our ability to distinguish between
abstract and concrete objects. I will discuss two predominant accounts of the abstract-
concrete distinction and will show how LQG makes trouble for them. Included in this
discussion will be a brief elaboration (§3.1) of the status of causation in LQG. I here
discuss the abstract-concrete distinction as an example of how LQG might force us to
reconceive conceptual distinctions or metaphysical doctrines which LQG touches on. In
order to streamline the following discussion, I will assume that 〈M, 〈s|〉 represents quantum
spacetime (as opposed to spacetime, for instance).
Account one: it is standardly suggested that the difference between abstract and con-
crete objects, if there be such a distinction, rests in how these objects relate to spacetime.
In particular, concrete objects are defined to be just those objects which exist at partic-
ular places and times; whereas, abstract objects do not exist at places or times. Tables,
chairs, and presumably spacetime itself are concrete objects; whereas, propositions, num-
bers, and Platonic forms are abstract. As one might expect since according to LQG there
is no space, time, or spacetime fundamentally, there is nothing fundamental which exists
at spatial places or times. Thus, it seems that so long as the abstract-concrete distinction
hinges on there being spacetime, then there is no distinction if LQG is true.37
We might try to avoid this conclusion by treating classical spacetime as a genuine object
of our ontology in the “emergence” regime. Huggett and Wu¨thrich’s account of emergence
utilizes effective structures (see §3.2 and 4.2). If we were so inclined, we could adopt a
metaphysics of objects whereby all classical or otherwise effective structures are more than
useful fictions and are distinct items of our ontology. These effective structures are distinct
insofar as they are not merely fundamental structures which happen to take useful forms.
According to this suggestion, there are classical tables and there are also the particles which
make up the table. The table is a thing unto itself and is not merely a convenient name
for a table-wise arrangement of quantum particles. If we adopt this view, we might try
to avoid the collapse of the abstract-concrete distinction since relativistic spacetime exists
as an effective structure. While it is true that, according to this metaphysics, there is
37 Presumably, this result would please any one, e.g. Maddy et al. (1990), for whom some mathematical
objects are also concrete.
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classical spacetime in the regime l lp, spacetime qua an effective structure, cannot play
the role which the abstract-concrete distinction requires of it. For instance, while there is
spacetime and therefore a distinction between abstract and concrete objects in the regime
l lp, what should we say about the non-classical regime l ≯ lp? Is there no distinction at
these energy scales? Do table-particles and numbers, for instance, become metaphysically
indistinguishable when l ≯ lp? Should the fact that there is a distinction between tables or
the particles which make up tables and numbers depend on how much energy with which
we are probing the table? Presumably not. Thus, even if we were to adopt a split level
ontology, we would not thereby save the abstract-concrete distinction qua spacetime.
Account two: it is standardly suggested that concrete objects are causal; whereas,
abstract objects are not. According to this suggestion, even if there were only quantum
spacetime, since tables are causal (let us assume), tables are thereby concrete; since num-
bers and propositions are non-casual, they are thereby abstract. Of course this suggestion
assumes that there are causes in quantum spacetime and, as I argued in §3.1, there might
not be causation or at least a very robust account of causation were spacetime defined to
be without a classical metrical structure. I will review this argument and strengthen it
with a few additional comments.
In section §3.1, I mentioned that if “spacetime” were without any metrical structure,
then there would be no lengths, no rectangles, no irregular shapes, no small, no near, no far.
I argued that, without these facts, the sense of change and thereby causation, which the
world contains, is significantly diminished. We might hope that by modeling the physical
basal structure of the world as including a quantum geometry, rather than as being a bare
substantival manifold, that these additional quantum geometric features will allow us to
model the sorts of changes which we require for causation. However, it turns out that
things are actually worse off than I have let on and, in particular, adding the quantum
geometry represented by the states 〈s| does not help causation. As soon as we include
the quantum geometry of LQG in our model of spacetime or quantum spacetime, there
is no longer any remaining physical change or variation over time whatsoever. Similar to
general relativity, the quantum geometry of LQG is coupled to whatever matter fields there
are. Thus, if our matter fields undergo any substantive change, the quantum geometry of
LQG will also undergo a change.38 However, as I have already discussed, the Hamiltonian
constraint requires that the quantum geometry of LQG be static. If the quantum geometry
is static, so too are the matter fields to which it is coupled. Thus, since the Hamiltonian
constraint requires that our matter fields remain static, in what sense are there causes in
LQG?
One way to escape this conclusion is to redefine how we model dynamics in LQG,
which happens to be an active area of research (Isham 1992, Kucharˇ 1992). If one of these
research projects is able to recapture the missing dynamics of LQG, then presumably we
could try to capture causation in LQG using the proposed dynamics. However, according
38 By substantive change, I mean to exclude cases such as the exchanging of identical particles.
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to our current understanding, LQG does not include dynamics and, thereby, does not
include enough structure for there to be causation fundamentally. If there is no causation
fundamentally in LQG, then what exactly distinguishes concrete and abstract objects?
Thus, if LQG is true, then fundamentally there is neither spacetime nor causation, at
least as these concepts have been standardly conceived. Without spacetime or causation,
we do not have the conceptual resources for there to be a distinction between abstract
and concrete objects, again, at least as this distinction has been standardly conceived. If
we think that there is a metaphysical difference, in kind, between mathematical objects
and dining room tables, then we will need to upgrade our account of concrete objects so
as to distinguish them from abstract objects. I will close this discussion with two final
comments.
First, how seriously should we treat the lack of causation and the collapse of the
abstract-concrete distinction suggested by LQG when LQG might very well be false? The
theory is not completely well-defined, and we don’t have a direct way to test any theory of
quantum gravity. Given these shortcomings, perhaps it is prudent to set aside the puzzling
ontology of LQG until the theory is confirmed. However, such reasoning would be mis-
taken. Even if LQG turns out to be false, we should take these lessons seriously. LQG has
shown us that it is possible to have a physical theory which does not include spacetime or
causation. If spacetime and causation are contingent structures, then we should be wary
of defining metaphysical doctrines, like the abstract-concrete distinction, in terms of them.
Presumably, if there is a distinction between concrete and abstract objects, the distinction
is independent of physics.
Second, in light of LQG, we might upgrade our account of the abstract-concrete distinc-
tion by making use of quantum spacetime. Under this suggestion, concrete objects are just
those objects which are in quantum spacetime and abstract objects are not. Though this is
a reasonable and tidy solution, I suggest that we not adopt it for the previously stated rea-
sons. If there is a metaphysical distinction between abstract and concrete objects, we need
a metaphysical account of this difference and not another distinction in terms of physical
structures. If LQG can erase spacetime, what hope do we have for quantum spacetime?
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5 Appendix
In this appendix, I will cover three central mathematical developments in LQG: the con-
straints derived from Dirac’s quantization procedure, the spin-network and s-knot Hilbert
spaces, and the area and volume observables. I discuss only these topics because a fuller
treatment should be sought for in a textbook, and yet these few topics are sufficient for
providing a first level orientation to the mathematics of LQG. This appendix is written
as an outline, and many details and caveats are left out. The bulk of this appendix is
reproduced from standard textbooks on LQG such as Rovelli (2004), Thiemann (2007),
and Gambini and Pullin (2011). When no citation is provided, the corresponding material
has been drawn from Rovelli (2004).
5.1 Constraints
In order to use Dirac’s quantization procedure, we need to write GR as a Yang-Mills theory.
Thus, the task we are first concerned with is how to squeeze GR into a Yang-Mills theory.
For more detail or further reading on this material, see Baez (1994). We begin by rewriting
Einstein’s field equations:
Rµν − 1
2
gµν(R+ λ) = 8piTµν , (16)
in terms of the “tetrad fields”:
e ≡ eIµσˆI ⊗ dxµ. (17)
In the case of LQG, with its su(2)-gauge field, the object e ≡ eI σˆI is a vector in Minkowski
space and the object eIµσˆI ⊗ dxµ is a “Minkowski-valued” one-form. Generic one-forms
are maps from tangent vectors to smooth functions. The above “Minkowski-valued” one-
form is a map from tangent vectors to vectors in a Minkowski vector-bundle. Because
we are working with vector bundles, every point of the spatial manifold has an associated
Minkowski space. The tetrad field associates a vector from each of these vector spaces to
every tangent vector at that point in space. Since this mapping is dependent on the spatial
manifold, we need both external (spatial) as well as internal (gauge) coordinates in order
to fully specify the tetrad (up to coefficients).
For any given internal Minkowski vector ~v = vµeIµσˆI , we define its length in the usual
way:
|v| =
√
−ηIJvµeIµ(x)vνeJν (x). (18)
Unsurprisingly, we can pull this metrical structure back to the base manifold and define
the metric on tangent vectors (vλ∂λ) to be:
gµν∂
µ∂ν ≡ ηIJeIµ(x)eJν (x)dxµ ⊗ dxν . (19)
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In a similar way, we can rewrite the Ricci tensor and Ricci scalar in terms of tetrad
fields which we can then use, in conjunction with (19), to rewrite (16) as:
RIµ −
1
2
ReIµ + λe
I
µ = 8piGT
I
µ . (20)
Here, I have kept only the coefficients of the tensors and have suppressed the basis vectors
σˆI ⊗ dxµ. The practice of keeping only the coefficients is common, though it can lead
to confusion if one is not careful to keep track of the indices. Throughout this account,
‘I, J,K’ range over internal Minkowski coordinates while ‘µ, ν, λ’ range over external spatial
coordinates.
In the same way that we use the Levi-Civita connection to define covariant derivatives in
GR (as well as covariant exterior derivatives), we use the su(2)-gauge field A ≡ AIJ(x)σˆI ∧
σˆJ ≡ AIµJ(x)σˆI ∧ σˆJ ⊗ dxµ to define a similar structure(s) in LQG:
Dµv
I ≡ ∂µvI +AIµJvJ . (21)
The gauge field A is also known as the vector potential in LQG and is one of the new
variables which Ashtekar used to reformulate canonical quantum gravity along the lines I
am here outlining. The vector potential plays an essential role in writing GR in terms of a
Hamiltonian which we need before we can use Dirac’s quantization procedure. Using the
vector potential, its canonical momenta E˜µI (x), the internal curvature tensor F
I
µν , and the
Lagrangian multipliers Nµ, N0, and λI , we can write the Lagrangian for GR as:39
L ≈
∫
d3(x)
(
E˜µI A˙Iµ +N0IJKE˜µI E˜νJFKµν +NµE˜νI F Iµν + λI(DµE˜µ)I
)
. (22)
According to Dirac’s quantization procedure, the three formulas appended by the La-
grangian multipliers are the constraints of LQG:
DµE˜
µ
I = 0, (23)
E˜νI F
I
µν = 0, (24)
IJKE˜
µ
I E˜
ν
JF
K
µν = 0. (25)
Importantly, all the physics of GR are encoded in the following constraints (Isham 1992,
p.34-35). The first constraint is called the gauge or Gauss constraint, the second constraint
is called the vector or the diffeomorphism constraint, and the third is the called the scalar
or Hamiltonian constraint. In turning GR into a quantum theory, we begin with a space
of functionals on the gauge potential Ψ[A] and promote the vector potential to play a dual
role as a multiplicative operator:40
AˆIµΨ[A] = AIµΨ[A]. (26)
39 Gambini and Pullin (2011, p.93)
40 ibid, p.99
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The canonical momenta are likewise promoted to the functional derivatives:
ˆ˜
EνIΨ[A] = −i
δΨ[A]
δAIν
. (27)
Plugging these operators into the aforementioned constraints, the physical states are de-
fined to be those states which are annihilated by the following three operator-constraints:
−iDµ δΨ[A]
δAIµ
= 0, (28)
F Iµν
δΨ[A]
δAIµ
= 0, (29)
IJKF
K
µν
δ
δAIµ
δ
δAJν
Ψ[A] = 0. (30)
The goal, then, becomes to find a set of states which solve these equations and hope that
they form a Hilbert space. In the following I will first construct the spin-network Hilbert
space whose states solve the Gauss constraint, (28). I will then construct the s-knot Hilbert
space whose states solve both the Gauss and diffeomorphism constraints, (28) and (29).
Unfortunately, we do not yet have a Hilbert space of states which solve the Hamiltonian
constraint.
5.2 Hilbert spaces
Nota bene: throughout the rest of this account, I utilize a formalism which is slightly dif-
ferent from that used in the main body of this text. For instance, rather than representing
spin-network states as |Γ(~x), jn, im〉 and |S〉, I will here use ΨS and |S〉. The majority
of the following construction of the states of LQG follows Rovelli (2014) and Rovelli and
Peush (2013).
The generic space of states with which we begin is S, a linear space of cylindrical function-
als, on the vector potential, A. A generic state in S is defined as:
ΨΓ,f [A] ≡ f(U(A, γ1), ...U(A, γL)). (31)
Here the γk are generic oriented paths in the “spatial” manifold Σ, and each U(A, γk) is a
holonomy along them. We use these states to define an inner product on S and, in turn,
use this inner product to construct K, the “completion” of S ⊂ K. In the following, I
will whittle this large space K into a proper subspace K0 whose states are gauge invariant
functionals.
First, we begin with a particular embedded network, Γ(~x), in some surface, Σ, and focus
our attention on those state functionals whose γk are the curves of the graph Γ(~x). We
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will use the graphs Γ(~x) to construct basis vectors for the subspace K0; however, in order
to do so, we need to assign an irreducible representation of the SU(2) group to each link
of the graph. By choosing a representation, we are able to associate with each point along
the links, γk, some particular matrices. As the holonomy drags our gauge field along the
link, the exponential map converts the (su(2)) algebra elements to (SU(2)) group elements
which we associate with some particular series of matrices (provided by the representation).
I will briefly explain how this process works and then how we use these representations to
build gauge invariant states.
The irreducible representations of SU(2) are given by the spin-j representations41 where
j ∈ (0, 12 , 1, ..., n2 ), n ∈ N. We assign some spin-label jl to each of the links l in Γ(~x), and
pick some matrix element (αl, βl) from the corresponding matrix Mjl(U(A, γl)). We then
construct the following “colored” cylindrical state ΨΓjlαlβl [A]:
≡Mj1(U(A, γ1))α1β1Mj2(U(A, γ2))
α2
β2
...MjL(U(A, γL))αLβL . (32)
The difference between these states and those defined in (31) is that the generic functional
in (31) is replaced by a generic multiplication of matrix elements. We call the process of
assigning an irreducible representation to each link “coloring” the links, and say that the
color of some link l is its associated representation jl. After coloring the links, we color the
nodes of the graph by associating a special vector (an “intertwiner”) to each node. Each
two nodes can have the same or different intertwiners associated with them.
Since the links of the graph are colored, each link has some Hilbert space Hj associated
with it. To each node we associate the tensor product of the Hilbert spaces associated with
the the links meeting at that node. This giant tensor product of Hilbert spaces contains a
subspace of vectors which are invariant under the action of SU(2)-gauge group. We color
the node by selecting one of these intertwining vectors. Once each node and link is colored,
we define a generic spin-network state ΨS [(A)] to have the form:
≡ ~VMj1(U(A, γ1))α1β1Mj2(U(A, γ2))
α2
β2
...MjL(U(A, γL))αLβL . (33)
Here, the vector ~V is tensor product of the intertwiners at the nodes. The difference between
these states and those defined by (32) is that these states are defined by contracting all the
end-point matrix elements whereas the states in (32) are defined as simply a product of
some of these elements. Since the vector ~V sits in the giant Hilbert space on which these
matrices act, it is not hard to pick vectors at the nodes to do the contraction. Generically,
~V will have the form:
Vm ≡ Vβmαm ≡ V
βml1
...βmlin
αml1
...αmlout
. (34)
41 For each j, we construct the Hilbert space Hj out of the polynomials of the form a2jx
2jy0+a2j−1x2j−1y1+
...a0x
0y2j on C2, where ai ∈ C2. The elements m ∈ SU(2) are mapped to linear operators Mj(u) on the
vectors of Hj . The trivial representation, j=0, is all the functions of the form a0x
0y0 and so is isomorphic
to C2. The fundamental representation of a group is the group itself and only occurs when the group is
itself a group of linear transformations on a vector space. The spin- 1
2
representation is isomorphic to the
fundamental representation, and the spin-1 representation is isomorphic to the adjoint representation.
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Where m selects the node. The idea is that the αm index on the node contracts all the
α indices of the links which “leave” the node, n, and the βm contracts the β indices of
the links which “enter” the node. In short, spin-network states are defined by contracting
all the holonomies around the embedded network in order of how the links enter and exit
the nodes of the network. A generic spin-network state ΨS [(A)] is picked out by the set
of information (Γ(~x), jn, im): an embedded graph in Σ whose links have been colored by
selecting representations (jn) and the nodes have been colored by selecting intertwiners
(im). It turns out that spin-network states are invariant under gauge transformations and
form an orthonormal basis for the (non-separable) Hilbert space K0 ⊂ K.
Figure 5:
For example, the spin-network represented in (figure 5) defines the following spin-network
state:
ΨS5 [(A)] = Vα1,α2,α3 [Mj1(U(A, γ1))α1β1Mj2(U(A, γ2))
α2
β2
Mj3(U(A, γ3))α3β3 ]Vβ1,β2,β3α4,α5 .... (35)
Here the ellipsis indicates the contraction along links four and five with the intertwiners at
the remaining nodes.
Recall, at this point, our gauge invariant states are in K0 which is a proper subspace
of K. Since both S and K0 are subspaces of K we cannot assume that all the states in
K0 will automatically be one of our cylindrical functions from S. We construct, therefore,
S0, the subspace of states from K0 which live in S. The space S0 contains all finite linear
combinations of spin-networks states and happens to be dense in K0. In the following, I
will use S0 and its dual space S∗0 to construct a space of diffeomorphism invariant states
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S∗Diff. Before turning to this task, however, since I will be switching back and forth between
states and their duals, I will use the bra-ket notation: a spin-network state will either be
written as ΨS or as |S〉 and I will refer to the states Ψ ∈ S∗0 as either Ψ†S or as 〈S|.
In order to construct S∗Diff, we begin by mapping those spin-network states ΨS in S0 to
the state 〈s| ∈ S∗0 ; where, 〈s| is a functional on states ΨS1 ∈ S0 defined by:
〈s|S1〉 ≡
∑
|S2〉∈{|S〉}Φ
〈S2|S1〉. (36)
Where the summation is over all states ΨS2 related to ΨS by a diffeomorphism UΦ: ΨS2 =
UΦΨS . It is not hard to show that the set of states {ΨS}Φ is the same set of states
{UΦ(ΨS)}Φ:
For any Ψ′ ∈ {ΨS}Φ, Ψ′ = UΦ1(ΨS), for some Φ1 diffeomorphism. Since the set
of diffeomorphisms form a group, UΦ2 = UΦ1 ◦UΦ−1 is also a diffeomorphism for
all UΦ1 and UΦ−1 . It is easily verified that Ψ
′ = UΦ2(UΦ(ΨS)), and consequently
Ψ′ ∈ {UΦ(ΨS)}Φ. The proof for the other direction is similar. Since the two
sets contain each other’s members, the sets are the same. We will use this result
in the following.
The point in mapping the states, |S〉, to the dual vectors, 〈s|, is that we can build dif-
feomorphism invariance into the mapping. A diffeomorphism UΦ on 〈s| is mathematically
equivalent to 〈s| ◦ UΦ−1 :
( ∑
{|S〉}Φi
〈S2|
)
◦ UΦ−1 = (37)
∑
{|UΦS〉}Φi
〈S2|. (38)
Where the summation is over all states ΨS2 related to UΦΨS by a diffeomorphism. Since
the set of states defining the summation in (36) and (38) are the same, the states UΦ〈s|
and 〈s| are the same.
The span of the states 〈s| ∈ S∗0 form the subspace S∗Diff of functionals which are both
gauge and diffeomorphism invariant. S∗Diff is a Hilbert space whose orthonormal basis
vectors are called spin-knot or s-knot vectors. In the main body of this text, I referred to
the generic state 〈s|, as defined in equation (36), as being an s-knot vector; however, this is
not quite true. While the generic states 〈s| do span S∗Diff, they are neither linear independent
nor orthonormal. Though a generic state of S∗Diff does not solve the Hamiltonian constraint,
these states are interpreted as representing the physical system of LQG.
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5.3 Geometric Observables
In this section, I will focus on the volume (Vˆ(R)) observable since I already discussed the
area observable in §2.3; I will reproduce the area observable below as a point of comparison.
This section is based on (Rovelli and Peush, 2013) and (Rovelli and Peitri, 2008).
Both the area and volume observables are defined by regions and surfaces in the “spa-
tial” manifold Σ: there is one observable per region or surface. A generic area observable
for some surface S is defined as:
Aˆ(S) ≡ lim
n→∞
n∑
k
√√√√−(∫
S
(n)
k
dσ1dσ2abc
∂xa(~σ)
∂σ1
∂xb(~σ)
∂σ2
δ
δAic(~σ)
)2
. (39)
Here S
(n)
k are n-many subdivisions of S. Since a generic spin-network state (§5.2) is identi-
fied with a particular embedded, colored graph (Γ(~x), jn, im), in the following I will write
ΨS [A] as ΨΓ,~j,~i[A]. I have changed notation from {im}, {jn} to ~i, ~j in order to more
easily express the spectrum of the volume observable. But first, the spectrum for the area
observable has the rather simple form:
Aˆ(S)ΨΓ,~j,~i[A] ≡
∑
n∈(S∩Γ)
√
jn(jn + 1)ΨΓ,~j,~i[A]. (40)
As we can see from this expression, the eigenvalues are exclusively controlled by the
“charge” or coloring of the links of the graph which cross the surface S.
The classical formula associated with the volume observable is given in terms of the
canonical momenta E˜νJ :
V(R) ≡
∫
R
d3x
√
1
3!
µνλIJKE˜µIE˜νJ E˜λK . (41)
Though one can unpack the operator form of the above expression, doing so would take us
outside the scope of this short appendix and would add little to our understanding of the
geometric structure of the operator. The corresponding spectrum of the volume observable
is given by:
VˆΨΓ,~j,~i ≈
∑
~β
λ~βPˆ~βΨΓ,~j,~i. (42)
And more specifically by:
VˆΨΓ,~j,~i ≈ λ~iΨΓ,~j,~i. (43)
The first thing to note is that this spectrum includes the projector Pˆ onto the some vector
~β. This projector projects onto sets of nodes of certain colorings, and is the reason why the
volume spectrum does not have as simple an expression as the area spectrum. In particular,
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the resulting eigenvalues λ~i are determined by which nodes are adjacent in the graph and
so cannot be specified generically. There is little else regarding the formal structure of
the observables which I feel is important for gaining an orientation to the mathematics of
LQG. I will, however, reiterate that the LQG-area and LQG-volume of physical surfaces
and regions diverge from the Riemannian-area and Riemannian-volume of surfaces and
regions. I mentioned this in §2.3 but is worth saying again: the volume of a region, as
defined by (41), does not change as we change the Riemannian size of the region being
integrated over, and only changes by changing the set of nodes contained in the region.
Similarly, in order to change the physical area of some surface we must change the set of
links which “cut” the surface.
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